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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
With the increasing threat of terrorism around the world, more attention has been 
paid to the security of the electric transmission infrastructure. Events in countries like 
Colo!'Tlbia, which has experienced as much as 200 terrorist attacks on its 
transmission infrastructure per year [1 ], show the vulnerability of the power system 
to these kinds of events. Although it is very difficult to avoid or predict when and 
where these terrorist acts can occur, quick assessment of the situation can help 
operators to take the optimal actions in order to avoid cascading events and the 
consequent partial or total blackouts. 
The mechanical failures resulting from malicious attacks on a transmission line 
are basically the same as those that would result when extreme natural events affect 
a portion of the transmission line. Thus, any analysis done in this direction can also 
help in taking preventive and corrective action when acts of sabotage are directed 
on the transmission infrastructure. 
The current method to assess the damage caused by any unexpected physical 
event on the transmission grid is the visual inspection of the transmission 
infrastructure [2]. With problems occurring in concentrated environments, like 
substations or generating plants, it is not difficult to find and assess the damage with 
a fairly small crew or with adequately localized video surveillance. But in 
transmission lines which are geographically dispersed over hundreds of miles, this 
task is more difficult. Distance protection in transmission lines can provide an 
approximated localization based on the impedance calculation of a fault [3]. 
However, this result can be affected by a variety of conditions present in the fault 
that can change the actual impedance measured. Nevertheless, once one of these 
events occurs, the operator in the control center only receives indication that an 
electrical fault has occurred, but not if it is temporary or permanent. Therefore, the 
operating standards state that he/she has to try to reinsert the faulted network 
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element in order to check the temporary/permanent condition of the event. Once all 
the attempts fail, then the element is marked as permanently out of service. The 
recent blackout events in the United States [4] and Italy [5] have shown that failure 
to assess and understand the condition of the power system and delay in taking 
appropriate corrective actions after just a single outage can lead to widespread 
blackouts of large areas of the power system. 
This thesis is the first work of an interdisciplinary group at Iowa State University 
working on innovative technologies for defense against catastrophic failures in 
power systems. It is intended to provide a novel approach to the technologies 
involved in the implementation of a sensor network design for a national electric 
energy infrastructure, and to establish the feasibility and the impact of using 
mechanical sensors to improve the robustness of power systems against 
catastrophic failures. 
The task of monitoring the structural integrity of transmission lines helps in 
assessing the effects of mechanical events and designing strategies to deal with 
them in a controlled manner. The purpose of using wireless sensors for collecting 
structural information from the transmission system is to provide a complete 
seamless sensing environment thanks to their main characteristics: ease of 
installation and replacement, low cost, networking and small size. 
This thesis proposes the utilization of wireless sensor network technology for 
detection of mechanical failures in transmission lines, such as: conductor failure, 
tower collapses, hot spots, extreme mechanical conditions, etc. The proposed new 
design involves the installation of mechanical sensors in predetermined towers of a 
transmission line, communicating via a wireless network. Some examples of the 
sensors involved are accelerometers, tension/ strain gauges, and tilt and 
temperature sensors. The main goal is to obtain a complete physical and electrical 
picture of the power system in real time, and determine appropriate control 
measures that could be automatically taken and/or suggested to the system 
operators. 
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Secondary goals of this thesis work include: 
• Examine the practicality of the application of wireless sensor technologies to 
improve power system security. 
• Propose a set of sensors suitable for the identification of physical problems in 
the transmission lines. 
• Propose a basic architecture for the wireless system. 
• Identify possible applications for increasing power system reliability and 
survivability based on the information collected in the field. 
For evaluating the feasibility of the concept, a dispatcher training simulator (DTS) 
based on the energy management system (EMS) platform from AREVA T&D was 
used for simulating the operation of the electric power system in real time as it is 
monitored at an actual energy control center. 
CHAPTER 2. MECHANICAL CHARACTERISTICS OF 
OVERHEAD TRANSMISSION LINES 
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Overhead transmission lines, by the nature of their exposed constructional 
characteristics are subjected to forces imposed by the environment such as wind, 
ice, snow, earthquakes and flooding; and also to human related hazards such as 
accidents and terrorism. They are geographically dispersed over hundreds of miles 
between interconnecting substations and their conductors are maintained at secure 
heights above ground by support structures (usually poles or lattice towers). These 
supports are hundreds of feet apart from each other resulting in the conductor 
forming catenary curves. 
Table 1. Common values for the spans of transmission lines 
Voltage Level 
Minimum Span Average Span Maximum Span 
[ft] [ft] [ft] 
115- 138 kV 600 700 800 
345 kV 500 900 1500 
500 kV 950 1200 1500 
A literature review [6] gave approximate normal values for spans of transmission 
lines of various voltage levels as shown in Table 1. It is to be noted that due to the 
different methods and technologies for constructing transmission lines, the results 
presented in Table 1 represent just a small population of the transmission lines in 
existence. They help to establish a reference frame for later discussion of the 
required range for wireless communications. In practice, spans can be as short as 
tens of feet and as long as 3000 feet for special crossings. 
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Components of a transmission line 
The designing process for overhead power lines conceptually considers them as 
composed of four individual components as shown in Figure 1: foundations, 
supports, interfaces and conductors, all of them having limited mechanical strength 
[7]. The design takes into account the coordination of the mechanical strengths 
required due to the fact that the failure of one of them may lead to the collapse of the 
entire transmission line. 
When the different components of a transmission line are subjected to their limits 
of strength, their failure behavior will also differ. For some components, the failures 
could be sudden, happening in a matter of fraction of seconds and can result in 
instability, rupture or complete separation. For some others, the failures are 
progressive, resulting in loss of strength that eventually leads to damage after long 
periods of time. 
Foundations 
--f Constructive Material Supports Bolts 
Guys E Connectors 
Interfaces - Insulators 
Hardware 
Conductors 
Figure 1. Transmission line components 
Foundations are the components designed to transfer the loads resulting from 
maintaining the conductors above ground into the subsoil with enough reliability. 
Foundations generally contain a combination of concrete and steel, and their 
construction depends on the terrain characteristics. Failures involving this 
component are almost always terrain related or ground level occurrences such as 
flooding, terrain sliding, earthquakes or bombing attacks. 
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Supports, the most visible components of a transmission line, can be constructed 
with a variety of materials and designs. They are the link between the power line 
conductor's assemblies and the ground, and their most important components are 
the towers or poles. The supports are composed by the pole body, cross arms and 
earth wire peaks and their constructing material can be wood, reinforced concrete 
and/or steel. Their main function is to withstand reliably the conductor forces and 
external loads [7]. Failures involving these components can be due to a direct effect 
of the environment or due to induced efforts by the foundations on the ground side, 
or the conductors on the overhead side. The design of transmission line supports 
calls for sustaining a range of credible mechanical stresses in an economically 
optimal way. Additionally, support design also takes into account the proper required 
clearances to ground and between conductors. See Figure 2. 
Typical 500 kV Support 
r-32·-i 
Typical 230 kV Double Circuit 
Support 
Figure 2. Typical dimensions for 230 and 500 kV supports 
The interfaces are the components that join the conductors and the supports. 
Their application defines the kind of mechanical loads that will be transmitted from 
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the conductors to the towers or poles. The most visible component of the interface is 
the insulator, which enables the proper electrical insulation, while providing 
mechanical attachment between the live conductors and the earthed parts of the 
supports. The actual elements connecting the conductors to the insulators and those 
to the supports are the fittings. They provide the appropriate degrees of freedom for 
the interface assemblies to follow the movement of the conductors without 
transmitting it to the supports [7]. Failure of these components is mainly a product of 
transmitted stresses from the conductors, rather than from the direct impact of the 
environmental conditions. 
Conductors are the means for the electric energy to flow from one transmission 
line end to the other. A continuous path of conductive material between both ends is 
required. This requirement means that the conductors also provide mechanical 
connection between the different structures that support them above ground. 
Conductor construction is comprised of copper or aluminum and for high voltage 
transmission also includes a steel core for mechanical strength. Motion induced by 
the environmental conditions (wind, ice, etc.) produces progressive weakening of the 
mechanical strength of the conductors at their point of coupling with the structures 
and also vibration in the different components of a support site. Sudden conductor 
breaking can also be a product of excessive tensional forces or direct impact of an 
external agent as in the case of accidents or terrorist attacks. 
The particular arrangement of the four main components in each structure 
determine the kind of forces it can withstand, and therefore, determines the role 
each support plays in maintaining the structural integrity of the entire transmission 
line. 
Support types and applications 
An extended definition of support will be used in this thesis for discussion 
simplicity. In this case, a support will be defined as the complete set containing the 
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foundations, support structure (tower or pole) and the intertaces between the 
conductors and the tower arms. 
Ideally, supports should be constructed robustly enough to sustain a broad range 
of mechanical events, and that on failure, the impact will not be propagated to the 
other components of the transmission line. On the other hand, if ideal conditions 
were always present on the line, the conductors could be laid on the supports 
carrying only their weight, without any worries about forces other than gravity 
affecting the supports. However, real conditions and economics play a role in the 
design of a transmission line, forcing the combination of both aspects. 
In order to withstand the different forces applied to the structures due to 
conductor loads, different type of supports are used: 
Suspension supports 
At suspension supports, conductors are fixed to suspension insulator sets, 
carrying the conductors in a straight vertical position, swinging in the prevalent 
direction of the conductors. They are not designed to transfer conductor tensile 
forces to the supports other than for abnormal conditions. Since this task does not 
require extremely strong mechanical characteristics, this kind of support is cheaper. 
Thus, long line sections are composed of this type of structure, in between strain or 
dead end supports. 
lntertaces at suspension supports are lightweight and pivoted, providing freedom 
for conductors to swing. Mechanically, the design provides for the longitudinal forces 
resulting from the product of gravity and wind to cancel in both directions of a 
suspension intertace, resulting in just the weight of the conductor plus ice accretion 
loads to be carried by the set of intertaces and supports. Only residual amounts of 
longitudinal stresses and vibrations are transferred to the supports. Therefore, the 
supports are not designed to withstand large amounts of longitudinal forces. Any 
medium to large imbalance can potentially produce the collapse of the entire 
structure. 
9 
Angle suspension supports are also part of this category for changes of line 
direction between 0° and 20°. In this case, the suspension insulator sets assume an 
inclined position, while maintaining residual force transference to the supports. 
Conductors are subjected to higher stresses at the attachment point than in the 
longitude of the span. As noted before, the forces actuating the interfaces fittings 
can induce bending stresses in the conductors that can ultimately force them to fail. 
In the free span, static tensile stress and small static and dynamic bending stresses 
are present [7]. In the vicinity of the attachment point, higher tensile and bending 
stresses can appear depending on the environmental conditions and conductor 
motion. 
Given its relatively lower cost, large sections of a transmission line are 
compounded by suspension supports. Thus, because of its construction 
characteristics, when a failure occurs on any of the suspension members of a 
determined section, there is a very high probability of collapse of the remaining 
suspension supports in the affected section, producing a cascading failure. Strain 
supports are placed regularly in transmission lines in order to avoid the extent of the 
damage. 
Strain, Angle-strain and Dead-end supports 
Strain and angle-strain supports carry the conductor tensile forces in the direction 
of the conductor and serve as rigid points in the line. They are designed for 
conductor tensile forces differing in both line directions and to provide protection 
against cascading structural failures. For long, straight line sections, strain supports 
are placed every 3 to 6 miles [7]. 
Dead-end supports carry the longitudinal tensile forces of the conductors in just 
one direction. These supports can be subjected to high torsional loads if only one 
circuit is installed on double circuit structures. 
Interfaces in strain and dead-end supports must be able to carry the tensile 
forces exerted by the conductors. In this case, the complete longitudinal force is 
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transferred from the conductor to the interfaces and to the support structures (poles 
or towers). The support structures are designed to carry any imbalance produced by 
different span lengths or difference in environmental conditions such as ice accretion 
or wind. Additionally, they are designed to prevent failure if all the conductors on one 
side break, limiting the amount of damage from cascading failures on the faulted 
side of the line. Regularly placed strain supports offer the required failure limiting 
characteristics in transmission lines. 
From the description of both suspension and strain/dead-end supports, it can be 
inferred that ultimately, strain/dead-end supports experience any major longitudinal 
effort occurring in any section of the line between two of them as shown in Figure 3. 
This conclusion will be used in later sections to establish the minimal requirements 
for sensor placement in order to obtain proper observability of the mechanical health 
of a transmission line. 
Main Direction 
of Force 
/ 
Suspension 
Support 
Suspension 
Support 
Strain/Dead-end 
Support 
Main Direction 
of Force 
Figure 3. Types of support and main acting forces 
Suspension 
Support 
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Mechanical loads on structures 
Given the constructive characteristics of overhead power lines, it is apparent that 
they are exposed to a variety of loads produced by weather conditions, accidents 
and intentional malicious acts. The effects of these loads produce detectable forces 
on the components of the line that can affect the ability to withstand the operating 
conditions. The different types of loads and their effect on the components of the 
transmission line are treated in the following sections. 
Base loads 
Gravitational (Vertical) and tensile (Horizontal) loads are present in the structures 
as a result of the force exerted by the conductor own weight. 
The static loads on an undisturbed transmission line are not very large and do 
not influence the design calculations in more ways than setting a starting point [17]. 
Wind 
Wind flowing around conductors produces alternate movements on them due to 
the creation of vortices at the top and bottom of the conductor [8]. These vortices 
produce alternate pressure unbalance, causing up-down movements on the 
conductors at right angles to the direction of the wind. Three different categories of 
cyclic conductor motion are recognized, being differentiated by their frequency, 
amplitudes and effects on conductors, interfaces and supports. 
Aeolian Vibrations: Are the most common form of vibration appearing in 
transmission lines. This kind of vibration appears under relatively low wind speeds 
and certain relative directions. Its main characteristics are small amplitude and 
relatively high frequency. It increases the tension stress on lines, produces 
conductor "turn" and creates vibration on the structures [7]. Reference [15] presents 
a technique for predicting the permissible level and duration of vibration that a 
conductor can withstand before failing, when monitoring data is available. 
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The first failures attributable to aeolian vibrations were observed in USA around 
1924 [13]. 
Conductor Gallop: This phenomenon is characterized by vertical low frequency 
and high amplitude conductor motion. It is usually caused by relatively strong and 
steady winds on asymmetrically iced conductors [8]. The extreme motion that 
characterizes this phenomenon makes it particularly dangerous for a transmission 
line, since it can damage conductors, interfaces, and even compromise the 
structural integrity of the supports. 
Galloping magnifies loads in a conductor and especially the vertical end forces 
on the supports [9]. 
Wake Induced Oscillation: This type of oscillation is peculiar to bundled 
conductors, and occurs when relatively moderate or strong winds act upon the line. 
It is produced by the shielding effect of the conductors directly exposed to the wind. 
The kind of orbits drawn by the conductors ranges from up and down movements, to 
circular or elliptical oscillations. It can produce damage limited to suspension 
interfaces and spacers; experience has shown that damage is largely localized in a 
few places on the line. 
Table 2, taken form [8] presents a summary of the characteristics and effects of 
the three types of cyclic conductor motion. 
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Table 2. Comparison of types of cyclic conductor motion [8] 
Types of Lines Affected 
Approx. Frequency Range 
(Hz) 
Approx. Vibration 
Amplitude (In conductor 
diameters) 
Weather Conditions 
Favoring Conductor Motion 
Wind Character 
Wind Velocity 
Condutor Surface 
Design Conditions Affecting 
Condutor Motion 
Damage 
Approx. time required for 
severe damage to develop 
Direct causes of damage 
Line Components most 
affected by damage 
Aeolian Vibration 
All 
3 - 150 
0.01 - 1 
Steady 
1 - 7 m/s (2 - 15 mph) 
Bare or uniformly iced 
Line Tension, conductor 
self-damping, use of 
dampers, armor rods 
3 months to 20+ years 
Metal Fatigue due to 
cyclic bending 
Conductor and shield 
wire strands 
Conductor Gallop 
All 
0.08 - 3 
5 - 300 
Steady 
7 -18 m/s (15 - 40 
mph) 
Assymetrical ice deposit 
on conductor 
Ratio of vertical natural 
frequency to torsional 
natural frequency; sag 
ratio and support 
conditions 
1 to 48 hours 
High dynamic loads 
Conductor, interfaces 
and structures 
Wake-Induced 
Oscillation 
Lines with bundled 
conductors 
0.15 - 10 
Rigid Body Mode: 0.5 -
80 
Subspan Mode: 0.5 - 20 
Steady 
4 - 18 m/s ( 10 - 40 
mph) 
Bare, dry 
Subconductor 
separation, tilt of 
bundle, subconductor 
arrangement, subspan 
staggering 
1 month to 8+ years 
Conductor clashing, 
accelerated wear in 
hardware 
Suspension interfaces, 
spacers, dampers, 
conductor strands 
Support members can also experience fatigue as a result of vibration induced 
from the conductor. Vibration controlling devices are used to diminish the effect on 
the support. However, direct excitation of support members appear to be less 
common than secondary excitation from conductor action. 
Snow 
Accumulation of snow and ice on conductors affect them in a two fold way. It 
increases the tensile forces on the wires due to the added weight, and additionally 
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changes their aerodynamic characteristics by changing the shape of the surface 
exposed to the wind, with the effects related to those described in the previous 
section. Additionally, by conduction of forces, increased tension and stress occur at 
interfaces and supports. Therefore, its influence tends to worsen the mechanical 
conditions experienced by transmission lines members. 
Vibration on supports 
Being exposed to the elements, transmission line supports are subjected to 
dynamic forces not only caused by conductor motion, but by the effect of weather or 
nature on them. Wind, snow, earthquakes, and terrain instability, among others can 
cause a direct impact on structure integrity. However, industry experience has 
shown that vibration on supports and their members rarely occurs and has seldom 
caused destructive failures. Only isolated occurrences have been reported [17]. 
Accidents 
There are a variety of accidental events that can affect the mechanical stress on 
transmission lines. Since they are distributed members of the power grid, they are 
exposed to all kind of animal and human activities. 
A report from Magana, Cathcart & McCarthy states that collision with 
transmission line wires are the first cause of helicopter accidents in the United 
States [18]. 
In the category of accidental occurrences, component failures can also appear 
due to defect, wear, fatigue or the complete failure of a transmission line support due 
to extreme environmental conditions such as earthquakes, tornadoes, hurricanes, 
landslides, etc. 
The majority of the events falling into this category can seldom be described 
statistically due to their inherent random nature. In fact, the extent of the damage 
caused by any accidental event cannot be predicted since it depends on several 
variables. As an example, Figure 4 shows a general aviation airplane stranded on a 
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high voltage transmission line after an accident, without resulting in the collapse of 
the line supports which could be expected from an accident of this magnitude. 
Figure 4. Plane accident over transmission lines 
However, the effects of accidents over transmission lines can be detected by the 
same set of sensors intended to monitor the effects of winds and ice. Any accident 
involves some kind of disturbance over the normal mechanical operating 
characteristics of the line. In the previous example it is obvious that the added 
weight over the conductors creates excess longitudinal stresses on suspension and 
strain/dead-end supports. The main difference between accidental and wind/ice 
effects relies on the characteristics of the failure, since it is very likely that an 
accident occurs suddenly, creating a sharp surge of stress over the conductors and 
supports, while failures related to wind and/or ice can build up stresses over time 
until a failed component appears on the line. 
Malicious intentional events 
One of the first events that come to mind when treating terrorist attacks and 
sabotage actions is the placement of explosive devices. Nevertheless, they are not 
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the only modality of sabotage intended to disrupt the physical integrity of the 
transmission network. 
In October of 2003, in Oregon and California, there were some reported cases of 
bolt removal from the legs of 500 kV transmission lines [19]. The act was apparently 
oriented to weaken the mechanical strength of the structures, however, no collapses 
occurred. This kind of act resulting in the weakening of the structural integrity of 
supports has been used widely for sabotaging transmission lines. There have been 
reports in the U.S. of cutting guy wires of strain/dead-end structures [20] , also, 
reports from U.S. and Colombia show that cutting the legs of lattice towers is also a 
method used by saboteurs. 
These kind of covert acts do not directly impact any of the mechanical variables 
of longitudinal stress or vibration but reduce the strength of the supports for 
withstanding any abnormal conditions. The consequence of this is that any 
environmental event that could be inside the design parameters of the line can now 
produce collapse of the weakened structure. 
Bombing produces a more direct impact over transmission structures and is 
widely used as the main form of attack over the electric infrastructure. Its main 
purpose is to produce the immediate collapse of the affected structure, which does 
not always happen. It has been noted that lattice towers are less prone to be 
affected by explosions than rigid construction poles mainly due to their open 
construction characteristics in which most of the expansive wave is dispersed 
through the gaps between frames [1 ]. The impact of bombing a transmission line 
support goes from collapse of the entire structure, to limited damage at the point of 
placement. Figure 5 and Figure 6 show the result of bombing attacks on two 
structures in the Colombian power system, where there was complete collapse and 
limited structural damage respectively. 
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Figure 5. Collapsed structure due to bombing. 
Figure 6. Tilted Structure due to foot damage 
18 
The explosive blast produced by a bomb placed at the foot of a transmission 
structure produces vibration by means of the direct impact of the expansive wave 
and indirectly due to ground induced vibration [10],[11]. The duration of the vibration 
phenomenon depends on a series of factors, from the size of the explosion, to the 
constructive characteristics of the support. However, it is not expected to remain for 
prolonged periods of time due to the natural damping provided by the structure. If 
the blast is not powerful enough to produce a complete collapse of the support, it 
would probably produce a tilt of the tower (as shown in Figure 6). In this case, 
differential longitudinal stresses can appear in suspension supports and increased 
tension can be detected in strain/dead-end supports. The treatment for collapsed 
structures is basically the same as for collapses induced by extreme environmental 
conditions. 
In the case of explosion, the mechanical effects appear suddenly and are 
expected to fade in time, therefore, sensing for these conditions have to be made in 
short intervals or by means of continuous monitoring. 
Similar to accidental events, it is not clear how to statistically model the 
probability of occurrence of a malicious event. They can only be dealt with after their 
occurrence. 
Temperature concerns 
The effect of the current flow on the rise of temperature on the conductors is well 
known. In fact, power transfer limits on transmission lines are imposed by 
determining the maximum temperature at which the conductors can be operated 
reliably. Normal transfer limits are associated with the ability of the conductor to 
sustain the normal operating temperature in a continuous manner. Emergency limits 
are established by relating the temperature rise with the time the conductor spends 
in this overloaded state without generating permanent damage. Based on this 
principle, a common practice for emergency limits is to use 130% overload during 30 
minutes [12]. The loading calculations presented in IEEE standard for calculating the 
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current-temperature relationship of bare overhead conductors [12] establish limits for 
determined weather conditions and conductor characteristics. However, since 
transmission lines extend over hundred of miles, weather conditions can be very 
dissimilar among different sections of the line. In addition, because of construction 
requirements, transmission lines may contain different conductor types in different 
sections. The common practice is to establish the section of the line with the most 
critical combination of average weather conditions and conductor types and from it, 
calculate the appropriate steady state and transient current ratings. 
In addition to the usual temperature effect, there is another concern about 
temperature rise in transmission lines. Hot Spots appear in the coupling between 
energized conductors and the clamps belonging to interfaces fittings. The term Hot 
Spot stands for regions of high temperature difference between the conductors and 
interfaces at the conductor coupling. They are not directly caused by conductor 
loading, but often their temperature rise is influenced by it. Their origin is related to 
deficiencies in the attachment of the conductors to the insulators. They commonly 
appear because of a loose connection or by the use of narrow clamps applying 
pressure in a narrow portion on the conductor [2]. The appearance of hot spots may 
degrade the mechanical reliability of conductors and connectors producing a thermal 
runaway situation that could lead to catastrophic failure of the point of attachment. 
Figure 7 shows a hot spot on a conductor coupling in a high voltage transmission 
structure [14]. 
Figure 7. Hot Spot in a conductor coupling [14] 
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Once a hot spot appears, a reduction of the current flowing through the line is in 
order until it can be repaired. The industry practice is to limit the normal power 
transfer capability of the line, thus, reducing power flows on the transmission line. 
Failing to do so could lead to deterioration of mechanical strength in the hot spot 
location and the consequent damage and long term unavailability of the transmission 
line. 
Allowable limits 
The National Electric Safety Code (NESC) is a voluntary standard that provides 
the basic provisions for guaranteeing the safety of persons during the construction, 
operation and maintenance of electric supply and communication equipment. It is 
not intended to be a design manual; it provides minimum requirements for the 
design of electric power lines. In the case of overhead electric transmission, it 
establishes clearance, loading and strength requirements. 
However, the limits established by the NESC are generally considered 
inadequate for standard ACSR and aluminum conductors [21 ]. Recommended 
practices for maximum allowable tension in percent of conductor strength are 
presented in Table 3, extracted from [21]. 
Table 3. Recommended Maximum Tension Limits in percent of conductor rated strength. 
ACSR Conductors All-Aluminum Conductors 
Initial Unloaded 33.3% 30.0% 
Final Unloaded 25.0% 20.0% 
NESC Loading District 50.0% 50.0% 
NESC Extreme Wind 70.0% 60.0% 
Extreme Ice 70.0% 60.0% 
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Reference [16] presents a comparison between the tension requirements of 
NESC and IEC, with similar values as the ones presented here. The recommended 
tension limits shown in Table 3 can provide a starting point for establishing the 
thresholds at which a sensor application can trigger warnings and alarms when 
confronted with abnormal mechanical conditions in a transmission line. This topic will 
be revisited in Chapter 6 to establish the mechanical failure modes present at any 
instant in a transmission line. 
Mechanical failures on overhead power lines due to the 
environment and sabotages 
A transmission line behaves mechanically like one continuous body, with the 
conductors as the main links between the support structures. In very rare 
circumstances, there is a truly isolated mechanical failure. In almost all cases the 
failure of one structure produces a chain reaction which generates a cascading 
failure. 
When a failure occurs in a suspension support and produces the separation of 
the conductor from its attachment point, the tensile stresses on the adjacent 
supports increase to almost double [22]. This effect arises because now each one of 
the supports must carry the weight of the two adjacent spans. Even, if the spans are 
short enough and there are parts of the interfaces still attached to the conductors, 
the stresses can be greater than double. As a consequence, the adjacent supports 
tend to be tilted to the center of the "doubled" span. If the forces acting are sufficient 
enough, they will also collapse. This dynamic continues until a sufficiently strong 
dead-end support stops it or when enough slack is developed in the conductors of 
the failed section to equilibrate the resultant longitudinal tension. The latter is usually 
called the Domino Effect. Therefore, once a failure occurs, it is transmitted to a 
number of supports which will, in general, suffer similar mechanical failure 
characteristics. 
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Nebraska Public Power District experienced the failure of 266 consecutive 
supports in the line Grand Island - Moore 345 kV on July 8, 1993. An analysis of the 
event, which is believed to be caused by extreme wind conditions, is presented in 
[22]. According to the paper, winds approaching 100 - 125 mph affected the 
structures in an ample area through the line. In determined points, loads on supports 
were in the order of 4000 to 6400 pounds, producing their collapse. Subsequently 
conductors and structures failed due to the domino effect. 
An ice storm on March 7, 1990, produced the failure of the Lehigh-Sycamore 345 
kV line in central Iowa, damaging a section between towers 51 to 119, with spans 
from 875 to 1550 feet. A total of 69 structures were affected by the failure with 
damages ranging from minor stress cracks to support buckling. The failure was 
contained by dead-end structures at the ends of the affected section. Wipf, Fanous 
and others at Iowa State University prepared a report analyzing the event for Iowa 
Power and Light Company [9]. After performing forensic analysis and simulation 
using finite element analysis, it was determined that the cause of the failure was ice 
accretion on the conductors, which led to support failure. The mechanics of that 
failure are important for this thesis because they can shed light on how the sensors 
will record any failure event when the proposed sensor system is implemented. 
In this case, it was concluded that the initiating event occurred because the 
stress on an insulator fitting at tower 99, due to ice accretion and possibly galloping, 
was beyond its breaking limit. The exact point of failure appeared to be the fitting 
point between the isolator assembly and the conductor. The resultant separation of 
the conductor from the support produced imbalance in the forces at the neighboring 
structures and posterior collapse by buckling. After that, all the other supports 
collapsed in a domino pattern due to the imbalance produced in each one as the 
previous structure failed. Since ice accretion is a progressive event, forces should 
have been increasing in the conductors and interfaces as the ice build up. A sensor 
capable of measuring the increase of stress in the conductors or the interfaces, 
could detect the progressive forces actuating in the couplings. Also, if a dynamic 
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event, such as galloping, appears in the line, sensors could also be capable of 
detecting the variable forces characteristic of these kinds of events. 
A failure involving the same Lehigh-Sycamore 345 kV line occurred on 
November 1, 1991. This time 114 structures were affected by the failure caused by a 
storm producing 15 inches of snow and winds up to 60 mph. A similar analysis as 
before was performed on the failed line [23], and reported the following findings: 
There were pre-failure conditions in which structures were deflecting due to the 
combination of ice and wind loads. Either broken wire conditions or an increase of 
wind and galloping loads caused a plastic hinge in one of the structures of the 
transmission line, causing it to tilt. Interestingly, the tilted tower didn't fall immediately 
to the ground thanks to the support offered by two of the three conductors, but after 
the stresses caused by the added weight were unbearable, the interfaces broke, and 
the support fell. A domino effect followed and was stopped after the failure of 114 
structures by a dead-end three pole support. 
The approach utilized by the previously presented analyses was to simulate the 
conditions leading to the event and compare them to the field observations. The 
methodology applied relied on static and dynamic analysis on a single structure and 
on a reduced model of the transmission line using finite element theory. 
Taking into account the construction characteristics of a transmission line, 
combined with the development of a reduced mechanical model of the line to which 
finite element theory could be applied, a methodology could be developed for 
optimizing the placement of sensors for tension, stress, strain and vibration in 
selected points of a transmission line. They also support the feasibility of proposing 
a "Mechanical State Estimator" for the mechanical sensor network, thus providing an 
approach to detect errors in the measurements collected from the field or even to 
detect malfunction of individual sensors. 
Terrorist attacks on the power system have been occurring in Colombia [1], 
Russia [24], India [25) and Pakistan [26) among others, causing disruption to the 
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supply of electric energy in wide areas of the corresponding systems. Attempts with 
more subtle methods have been recorded in 2003 in Western US [27]. 
In most of the cases in the Colombian transmission infrastructure, the attacks 
over the system have not been capable of producing generalized blackouts. Even 
with attacks synchronized in time aimed at different transmission links hundreds of 
kilometers apart. Only one of such events led to a major blackout of the system. In 
this incident bombing attacks on three main double circuit transmission lines resulted 
in the overload of the one remaining link which subsequently tripped and caused a 
blackout of an entire operating area [1 ]. 
When dealing with terrorist groups that exert some amount of control over 
territory, it can be expected frequent sabotage over transmission assets in or around 
that zone. In this case, those transmission assets are candidates for placement of 
appropriate sensors. In other cases, the sabotage actions can be correlated to 
vectors or axis of mobilization, in which the groups move along a path crossing 
different transmission assets, in such case a strong correlation can be drawn 
between the assets being sabotaged and the timing in which their failure occur. 
The current methodology for assessing that an attack has been made over a line 
is to see the operation flags of the distance relays. Given the small likelihood of 
three phase short circuits in EHV transmission, if a distance relay signals it, it is very 
likely that a tower have been toppled. Subsequently for making sure, a tryout is 
ordered and if it is rejected, the line is marked as permanently out of service. 
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CHAPTER 3. SENSOR SELECTION AND PLACEMENT 
Transmission lines are constantly disturbed by the environment, thereby 
producing stresses and movement in their components. There are a number of 
sensors capable of monitoring mechanical variables on the line that could be used to 
detect abnormal conditions when extreme environmental events or human related 
accidents or sabotages appear. 
Currently there are a variety of sensors that can offer the required sensing 
characteristics. They have been used successfully in specific applications in 
transmission lines. A survey of those applications will be presented later in this 
chapter. 
Every transmission line is different. They are built over large areas with different 
terrains and different environmental conditions. This characteristic make the 
designers apply different kinds of support structures (Steel or wood materials, poles 
or lattice towers), different designed tensile strength for the conductors and supports 
and different span lengths. However, some constructive characteristics remain 
common, such as the use of suspension and strain/dead-end supports. The sensor 
applications described in this chapter will take into account the common 
characteristics to propose a general setup for the sensors, without including the 
details specific to a particular transmission line, such as setting failure thresholds for 
the variables or the level of relation between them. However, it should be noted that 
in order to achieve a desired selectivity for the application of sensors to detect 
mechanical faults on transmission lines, the calibration for the sensors should avoid 
sending signals of significance when only normal environmental conditions are 
present. 
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Mechanical transducer types and principles 
For the kind of events required to be sensed by the proposed wireless network 
setup, sensors for detecting changes in stress, acceleration, angular position and 
temperature are suggested. 
Sensing stress 
Stress is defined as the force per unit of area [28], and when applied it can 
deform an object. The stress can be normal to the surface of the component, or it 
can be tangential (shear). Forces present in transmission lines conductors are 
mainly pure tension, and are directed outward, normal to the cross section of the 
conductor [7]. The general expression for normal stress is: 
F 
<Y=-
a 
Where: 
u: Stress resulting from the application of force F 
F: Force applied to the element (Tensile Force on the conductor) 
a : Cross section area of the conductor 
Sensors designed to measure stress rely mainly on the piezoelectric effect. 
These sensors directly convert mechanical stress into an electrical signal (voltage or 
frequency), which can be measured by any electrical metering device. 
Sensing strain 
Bodies subjected to tensile loads experience some level of change in longitude 
[28]. The resulting stretch or elongation is called strain. The strain per unit of 
longitude is normally called unit strain. However, the common practice is to use the 
term strain to refer to the unit strain of an object according to the following 
relationship: 
t5 
£=-
l 
Where: 
£: Unit Strain on the element (conductor) 
'5: Total Strain experienced by the conductor 
l : Overall length of the conductor 
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Sensors designed to measure strain rely mainly on the piezoresistive effect. Also 
called strain gauges, they are measuring elements that convert force, pressure, 
tension, etc., into an electrical signal. They are the most universally used devices for 
electrical measurement of mechanical quantities. A strain gauge is a resistive elastic 
sensor whose resistance is a function of applied strain [29]. 
Sensing acceleration 
Accelerometers are usually referred to as acceleration sensors. They rely on 
different effects for sensing the rate of change of speed of a body [28]. In its core, 
the physical phenomenon evaluated is the vibration of a sensing device, felt as 
periodic oscillatory motion around a reference point. Although some common 
applications such as shock analysis, linear acceleration or angular acceleration do 
not involve vibration, the internal design of the sensor rely on it to measure the level 
of acceleration of the sensed component. 
Sensing angular position 
The goal of an angular position sensor is to determine the angular displacement 
of an object in relation to a reference axis [28]. Usually, this kind of sensors does not 
provide dynamical information, but absolute displacement. When requiring rate of 
change information, accelerometers can provide the best sensing characteristics 
[29]. Angular position sensors are also known as tilt sensors. 
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A common tilt sensor is the inclination detector or inclinometer, which measures 
the angle from the current direction to the center of the earth and its primary 
actuating force is gravity. 
Sensing temperature 
Temperature can be measured directly through contact or by detecting radiated 
energy [28]. There are sensors specifically designed for each application, and both 
have intrinsically different measurement principles. 
Contact temperature sensors rely on the conduction of heat from the object to the 
sensing element through an appropriately conditioned interface between them. 
Thermocouples and resistance temperature detectors (RTD) belong to this category. 
In the case of non-contact, or radiation sensors, there is no need of physical contact 
between the object being sensed and the transducer. Infrared thermometers are a 
common example of these types of sensors and are widely use by maintenance 
crews for detecting heat related problems in transmission lines (Figure 7). 
Previous experiences using sensors in transmission lines 
Detecting critical conditions due to the effect of climate and weather on 
transmission lines have been of research interest since the initial stages of the 
power transmission industry. Utilities have relied on a variety of efforts to determine 
and evaluate the mechanical state of transmission lines, mostly in dangerous places 
through the extension of the line. The use of remote sensing has increased 
accordingly with the advancing technology. However, those efforts have been 
oriented towards off-line data recollection or installed at very specific points on the 
network, and used primarily for maintenance purposes. 
A group of researchers of Tohuku Electric Power Co. and Hitachi Cable in Japan 
installed a remote measurement facility on the 154 kV Hokusei Line [30] for 
monitoring ice accretion on power lines in mountainous zones. In that particular 
setup an array of tension, temperature, lightning sensors, TV cameras and current 
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transducers work together to detect and signal ice accretion levels that require 
attention from maintenance crews. A byproduct of the setup is the availability of 
more precise fault localization. For transmitting the information collected at each 
tower, the system uses previously installed composite fiber optic overhead ground 
wires (OPGW), relaying data from each tower to a central processor installed in the 
substation. Figure 8 shows the arrangement of the sensors on two towers, and 
Figure 9 shows the architecture of the complete system. 
(No .. 63 Towed f411"1li<Y {No. no Tower) 
Figure 8. Sensor arrangement in supports for the Hokusei line project 
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Figure 9. System Architecture of the Hokusei line project 
Palazuelos and Fernandez[31] implemented a vibration recording and control 
method [31], consisting of an accelerometer attached to the ends of the conductor at 
the point of contact with the retaining clamp. The recording element stores regular 
measurements of the bending amplitude of the conductor relative to its retaining 
clamp. The actual monitoring device did not come with communication capabilities; 
therefore the measurements had to be stored in the equipment memory and later 
recalled when the monitoring device was removed from the line. 
On line monitoring of conductor temperature is a trend that has increased since 
the establishment of deregulated markets. Mostly it is intended to dynamically 
evaluate the power transfer capability of the transmission lines optimizing the use of 
the transmission system by using its entire capacity. 
The induction of current in high resistance grounded wire placed in a span at 
certain distance from the conductors has been proposed as a method for measuring 
conductor sag and core temperature [32]. It relies on the change of induced current 
with the distance between phase conductors and the test wire, and indirectly obtains 
the temperature through calculation of the resulting conductor elongation. A setup 
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like this is suitable for specific, localized application, but could be an expensive 
option for the objectives of the present work. 
A prototype for a real time dynamic system for determining the capacity of a 
transmission line was implemented by EDM International for the California Energy 
Commission [33]. It proposes the use of two sensor systems to evaluate the amount 
of sag a conductor experiences in real time, involving some level of wireless 
communications. The first system, a pulsed laser distance measurement (LDM) 
based sensor, utilizes a small, low cost pulsed laser emitter/receiver. It is conceived 
to be placed in a suitable location along the span to monitor the distance to the 
ground and calculate sag through the difference of distance from the resting position. 
The second involves a machine vision system which determines the position of a 
transmission line with respect to the ground using a passive target attached to the 
conductor at a fixed distance. Image processing algorithms are used to calculate the 
movement of the target inside the field of view of the imaging system, thus obtaining 
the relative distance from a resting position. Figure 10, taken from [33], shows a 
sketch of the localization of both systems in a particular span. 
Figure 10. Proposed methods for monitoring sag in Real Time 
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Proposed sensor selection 
The kind of information provided by the sensors is closely related to the structural 
characteristics of the transmission lines and towers. Since the intention of placing 
the sensors in the transmission lines is to detect catastrophic events (i.e tower 
downing due to storms, earthquakes or terrorist actions), proper coordination should 
be achieved between normal structural stresses and the ones present at failures. 
For applications in building structures monitoring, researchers have found that 
the utilization of acceleration, strain and displacement sensors can provide an 
appropriate level of observability for earthquakes and wind, as shown in Table 4 [34]. 
Table 4. Suggested sensor applications for Building Monitoring 
Application Sensor 
Observation Acceleration 
Experiment Acceleration, Strain 
Structural Control Acceleration 
Health Monitoring Acceleration, Strain 
Damage Detection Acceleration, Strain, Displacement 
The previously presented sensors can also measure the mechanical conditions 
of the transmission line infrastructure. Although a variety of variables can be 
measured with the current technology, transmission line support structures have 
constructive characteristics closely related to building structures, therefore it is 
proposed here that a similar set of acceleration, strain and displacement sensors 
can be used to detect actual and potential catastrophic events. 
33 
Additionally, given that temperature is also a concern in electric energy 
transmission; an application can take advantage of the sensing infrastructure to 
place temperature sensors at the attachment point of conductors to detect possible 
hot spots and overheating problems related to overloads. 
Table 5. Sensor Application Matrix for a Transmission Line 
Tension/Strain Vibration Tilt Temperature 
Normal Conditions Normal Values Normal Values Normal Values Normal Values 
Ice Accretion Increased, inside Normal Values Normal Values Normal Values Low Wind Limits Very Small Angle 
Medium - High Wind Increased, inside High Frequency Normal Values Normal Values Bare Conductor Limits Inside Limits Very Small Angle 
Medium - High Wind Increased, inside High Frequency Normal Values Normal Values Uniform Ice Limits Inside Limits Very Small Angle 
Galloping Increased, at Limit Low Frequency Oscillating Values Normal Values 
values High Amplitude 
Explosion Blast Sharp Increase Sharp Amplitude Oscillating Values Temporary rise Increase 
Increased in 
strain/dead-end 
Compromised supports No Information Apreciable Tilt Normal Values Structure 0-90 degrees 
Loss of equlibrium in 
suspension supports 
Collapsed Structure Sharp Increase, then No Information Apreciable Tilt Normal Values goes to zero Close to 90 degrees 
Isolated high 
Hot Spots Normal Values Normal Values Normal Values temperature 
measurement 
Increased strain Uniform between Overheating 
caused by sagging Normal Values Normal Values conductors and 
nearby supports 
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After close analysis of the mechanical characteristics of transmission lines and 
the effects of the environment, operating point, accidental events and sabotage over 
them, a sensor application matrix is proposed for monitoring the structural health of 
a transmission line as a complete body, as shown in Table 5. 
It is recommended to apply tension sensors at the interfacing assemblies of all 
strain/dead-end supports in order to maintain a complete observability of the 
longitudinal tensile forces acting on the transmission line. This setup has been 
previously applied with optimal results in the Hokusei line project presented earlier. 
Foil strain gauges are generally cheaper than tension sensors and have the 
advantage of being attached directly to the conductor, thus its application is 
recommended at suspension supports. 
Measurements in one support are related to the neighboring support because of 
the link provided by the conductors, hence, the effect of a mechanical event can be 
observed farther than the adjacent spans. 
It should be noted that all the measurements from the proposed sensors are 
related in various ways. The relationship can be between different sensors applied to 
the same structure, as in the case of tension and strain, or between vibration and tilt, 
or it can be between the same kind of sensors at different locations, as in the case of 
strain sensors applied to the conductors at both ends of a suspension interface, or in 
the case of tension sensors in adjacent structures. Another interesting case is the 
detection of overheating in the conductors due to overload, in which it is expected 
that temperature sensors would detect rise in the temperature in the three 
conductors of the same circuit, and even between adjacent structures; however, if 
there is a case of an isolated temperature measurement, it is likely because of the 
occurrence of a hot spot in the line. 
Additional cases relate temperature rise in the conductors with an associated 
increase in sag, therefore producing strain, which can be measured at the conductor 
attachment points. Wind on the conductors produces increased tension, bending 
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stress and also vibration. Tension produces strain that can be related via the 
conductor stress-strain diagram. 
The dynamics of the events affecting a transmission line plays a fundamental 
role in the selection of the sensor applications and in the design of the complete 
sensor system. Additional event classification can be obtained by taking into account 
the difference on the dynamics of the failures. Wind and ice accretion do not appear 
suddenly; in the case of winds, they increase in time with deteriorating climatic 
conditions. Ice buildup is a progressive phenomenon that gradually adds weight to 
the conductors, consequently, increasing tension and strain in them. Accidents and 
sabotage are sudden; their effects may appear as a sharp increase of the sensed 
variables. An act of sabotage by weakening the structure can be distinguished if 
there is a collapsed structure in which previously was not detected any anomaly in 
the variables. 
Most of the monitoring applications have relied on performing sensing at regular 
intervals of time and saving them on a local memory for later download. There are 
applications in which, due to the speed of the phenomenon, a significant event may 
be missed between two scan times. An example is the case of sabotage via a 
bombing attack. The implementation proposed requires constantly monitoring of the 
physical quantity being measured and updating every time it detects a significant 
change. 
In normal operation and even under high wind/ice conditions in which there is no 
compromise of the mechanical integrity of the line, it is unlikely that electrical faults 
will occur unless vegetation plays a role. Therefore, a direct relation between a 
proposed wireless mechanical sensor network (WMSN) and the electrical protective 
elements of the line is not expected. When events develop leading to a 
compromised or a completely failed structure, it is expected that the conductors will 
have a contact or grounding, resulting in phase to phase, phase to ground or even 
three phase short circuits. In this case, high correlation can be inferred between the 
output of the electrical protective equipment and the output of the proposed WMSN. 
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Optimized maintenance practices can also be achieved by the analysis of the 
measurements provided by the proposed sensor system. Collected statistical 
information about stress and vibration in conductors can help maintenance 
engineers to optimally schedule maintenance, or perform preventive maintenance in 
lines with excess mechanical stress. The ability to detect hot-spots can provide 
surveyors with select locations to perform more thorough infrared analysis in 
structures. The statistical data and the correlation with confirmed faults can also 
supply the information for calculating failure probabilities. 
Other components of the transmission grid can be monitored using sensor 
technologies. In fact, currently many of them use some kind of sensor application for 
protective duties. Transformers contain pressure and temperature sensors. A 
proposed application matrix is presented in Table 6. 
Table 6. Sensor application matrix for power systems 
Transmission Circuit 
Quantity Substations Transformers 
Lines Breakers 
Acceleration x 
Vibration x x x 
Stress/Strain x 
Tension x 
Shock x x 
Pressure x 
Temperature x x x x 
Inclination/Tilt x x x 
Position x 
Protection Relay Output x x x x 
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Proposed sensor placement 
The selection of sensors proposed in the previous section guides the choice of 
locations within a support on which to place them. 
Regular tension or strain sensors can be mounted at the interfaces of 
strain/dead-end supports. It is recommended to install them at all the conductor 
attachments of all strain/dead-end structures because of their important role in 
maintaining the physical integrity of the transmission line. This can result in a high 
level of observability on any transmission line for mechanical events that involve 
change over normal tensile conditions, such as high winds, ice accretion or 
compromise of the structural integrity of surrounding structures. 
However, for a more complete assessment of the mechanical conditions of the 
line, as in detecting the unlikely event of an isolated failure, it is recommended to 
measure tensile forces on conductors attached to a number of suspension supports. 
Since there is no complete longitudinal force transfer between the conductors and 
suspension supports interfaces, the appropriate sensor to use is a foil strain gauge 
affixed to the conductors close to the point of attachment to the interface. A first 
approach to the optimization of strain sensing capabilities on suspension supports is 
to place them on both sides of the point of attachment of the conductors every third 
tower as shown in Figure 11 using a top down view. In this manner, each support 
monitors only one phase conductor, but the system do not loose observability 
because each attachment point not being monitored directly, is monitored by an 
adjacent support. 
Strain/Dead-end support Suspension Supports 
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Figure 11. Tension/Strain monitoring on suspension supports 
Tension sensors applied to strain and dead-end supports have no high voltage 
isolation problems, since they can be placed in the insulator arrangement [30]. 
Tension sensors applied at suspension supports have to be placed directly into the 
conductor, therefore involving problems with the insulation levels if a regular wired 
data link needs to be used; this offers a very good reason to use smart wireless 
sensors for this application since the communication will be provided via the wireless 
link. 
Vibration and tilt sensing is often provided by accelerometers. It is proposed to 
install one in the support body to detect vibration and tilt in the structure and in the 
conductor attachment points for detecting wind induced vibration. Installation in 
conductors is recommended for maintenance optimization, but if cost is a constraint, 
their application can be omitted. 
Installation of temperature sensors for overload detection can be optimized given 
that heating conditions due to overloads are uniform in relative long portions of the 
line. However, since hot spots are highly localized phenomena, they can only be 
detected by placing temperature transducers close to all the points of attachment of 
conductors. Again, cost is the determinant factor for selecting the complete 
application for hot spots. 
Figure 12 presents the overview of the sensor placement proposed in this 
chapter. 
Strain/Dead-end Support 
Application of tension/strain 
sensors on all conductor 
interfaces 
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Suspension & Strain/Dead-end 
Supports 
Application of temperature 
sensors in all conductor 
interfaces 
L____ 
Suspension Support 
Application of tension/strain 
and vibration sensors on 
both sides of the conductor 
interfaces 
Suspension & Strain/Dead-end Supports 
Application of Accelerometers for Vibration 
and Tilt monitoring in all structures 
Figure 12. Overview of the sensor placement recommendation 
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CHAPTER 4. THE WIRELESS MECHANICAL SENSOR 
NETWORK 
40 
Wireless sensor networks are a relatively new technology, appearing as the 
combination of various other technologies established for a long time. The trigger for 
the widespread use of wireless sensor networks has been the advance of wireless 
communication and electronics micro-integration. The practical consequence of 
these advances is the availability of low cost systems to provide sensing and 
communication capabilities in one single package. In fact, a number of applications 
that usually relied on wired communications for collecting data from sensors in the 
fields, now use wireless sensor networks because of the reduce cost of 
implementation and maintenance [34]. 
In the structural monitoring field , the use of sensors to monitor the response of 
bridges have been extensively applied since 1977, instrumenting 61 long span 
bridges in the United States [35]. Sensors have been localized in particular places in 
the structures and the collection of data was done via wired connection to a central 
data processor. Now, researchers are using wireless sensor technology for obtaining 
structural health monitoring data. Kurata, Spencer and Ruiz-Sandoval [34] proposed 
the use of the Berkeley Mote platform for vibration and strain monitoring in civil 
structures. Lynch, Sundajaran and others [35] , propose to take advantage of the 
limited computational power available in each smart sensor of a wireless sensor 
network to perform localized structural health assessment. The advantage of this 
approach is the reduction of the traffic in the communication channel and the ability 
of each sensor to continually assess the performance of the monitored variable for 
the identification of damage. 
Previous monitoring applications on transmission lines have made use of wired 
communications for sending the signals to a central location, taking advantage of the 
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increasing trend of installing fiber optic ground wires (OPGW) in the transmission 
lines [30]. A drawback of the previous implementation is the requirement that each 
transmission line should have an optical fiber ground wire installed which is not the 
case in all lines and also involves high installation and operating cost to implement. 
Additionally, each support with sensing capabilities should have a fiber optics 
interface for coupling the electrical sensor signals to optical signals, incrementing the 
costs and making more difficult the installation. An advantage is the high bandwidth 
associated with the use of fiber optics. 
Irrespective of the selection of the type of communications link between supports 
(wired or wireless), there is still the problem of relaying the signals from the sensors 
installed in the structures, interfaces and conductors to the collecting central unit in 
each support. Again, wired connectivity can be used for some of the sensing units, 
but it involves running signal cabling through the structures with the associated costs 
of installation. 
In this chapter a conceptual design for the architecture of a Wireless Mechanical 
Sensor Network (WMSN) for transmission lines using wireless links between the 
sensors and the central processors in each support, and between central processors 
in different structures will be proposed. This approach takes advantage of the low 
cost and ease of installation of the system and the ability to work without the need 
for additional communication infrastructure. 
Characteristics of a wireless sensor network 
The concept of a wireless sensor network involves the combination of sensing, 
data processing and communications capabilities in just one piece of equipment 
small enough to be cheap and efficiently installed, covering large networks of those 
sensing nodes that can monitor the overall behavior of a physical environment. The 
original concept calls for the deployment of a large number of sensors in which their 
localization is not known previously and let them establish optimal network 
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topologies to communicate the status of the monitored system to a central processor 
or sink. 
The hardware of a wireless sensor network node consists of sensing devices, 
analog to digital converters, a microprocessor, data storage, a data communications 
device and a power source, as shown in Figure 13. Actual technology has permitted 
the integration of almost all of this functionality in a small package with low power 
requirements, permitting the deployment of sensor nodes for virtually undefined 
periods of time. 
Power 
Unit 
"J'-J§TWORK 
Communications 
Unit 
Processing 
& 
Data Storage 
Sensing Elements 
& 
ADC 
Figure 13. Wireless Sensor Node Hardware 
The ability to integrate locally the sensing and data processing functionality 
provides any node with the capability to avoid the transmission of large amounts of 
monitored data. Instead, local processing can perform analog to digital conversion, 
signal conditioning and analysis, convert raw information to numerical engineering 
values, detect anomalies and even obtain modes of oscillation for a determined 
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structure. Thus, communication bandwidth utilization is required just when the node 
determines that the information obtained from the environment is worth being 
transmitted, or when it is interrogated by the central processor or any other node. 
The communication capabilities of each sensor node enable it to communicate 
with others via a wireless medium. However, given the power consumption and size 
constraints, there is a limit on the transmission range. Most applications do not 
exceed 500 feet, while tens of feet are a typical unit of measurement [37]. The 
conceptual design establishes that for covering long distances, the wireless sensor 
network must route the information through a series of hops between deployed 
nodes. In combination with range limitations, bandwidth presents another constraint 
for data transmission in wireless sensor networks. A tradeoff exists between the 
amount of exchanged information and the speed of their exchange because of this 
constraint. 
The combination of communication and processing functionality allows the 
sensor network to achieve collaborative computing, using the processing power of a 
varied group of sensors. The result of such collaboration is the construction of a 
complete image of the status of the monitored environment with little or no 
intervention from a central processor. 
Power management is one of the main technological concerns related to wireless 
sensor networks. The wireless characteristic of this kind of networks, in combination 
with the requirement for the sensor nodes to operate without intervention for large 
periods of time makes power supply and energy conservation an important topic. In 
addition, the small size of sensor nodes limits the amount of energy that can be 
supplied to it given that it also limits the size of the power source. The power 
requirements for a sensor node are driven by the amount of processing expected, 
the frequency of operation and the communications functionality. In fact, 
communication is one of the most energy consuming operations for a sensor node, 
with each bit costing as much energy as 1000 processing instructions [37]. 
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Different options exist for supplying energy to the sensor nodes. The most 
common method is the use of long life batteries which can provide energy for 
extended periods of time to low power consuming sensor nodes. Another popular 
method is the utilization of solar cells to charge rechargeable batteries on the 
sensors. More promising for the application proposed in this thesis work are the 
methods for harvesting energy from the environment in which the sensors would be 
installed. 
Electric energy can be collected by magnetic induction, thanks to the fact that 
energized conductors are available close to the appliances. This method was 
employed by EDM International for the real time monitoring of overhead lines 
proposal in California using commercially available inductive power sources [33]. 
Another feasible method relies on the application of the piezoelectric effect for 
harvesting electric energy from vibration or strain [39], which makes it ideal for 
sensing units placed on conductors. 
The utilization of a combination of the previously proposed methods and 
rechargeable batteries for backup power can guarantee long life deployments of 
sensing units with practically no need for maintenance. 
Proposed architecture for a transmission line WMSN 
The concept of a wireless sensor network envisions the deployment of a large 
number of sensing units disregarding their localization. This is not the case for the 
application proposed in this thesis work. For the recommended implementation of a 
wireless mechanical sensor network for transmission lines, the localization of each 
node is determined in the pre-deployment phase, with sensors of particular 
characteristics placed in predefined places along the support structures and 
conductors. Thus, complex routing algorithms are not required for the nodes in this 
application. 
It is proposed that communication between structures occur via wireless linkage; 
even when having the opportunity to rely on wired communications through fiber 
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optics as discussed in the introduction of this chapter. Wireless communication 
between towers is recommended because it could provide a reliable transmission 
path in the event of a failure of a support structure, provided that the causal event 
does not damage the transmitter (as in the case of an explosion caused by acts of 
sabotage). It has been shown previously that the implementation of wireless 
communication between towers could also reduce the costs of installation and 
maintenance of the complete wireless mechanical sensor network. 
The proposal of the architecture for the wireless mechanical sensor network 
takes into account the previously mentioned topics, additional constraints caused by 
the characteristics of the transmission lines and also the particular requirements 
established by the design of the application. 
In order to assess the overall mechanical and electrical condition of the 
transmission infrastructure, a central processor in the energy control center should 
obtain the information from the sensor networks installed in different transmission 
lines. This can easily be achieved by taking advantage of the current installed 
communications infrastructure between the substations and the energy control 
center. The proposal in this thesis is to include the messages originated from the 
WMSN with the electrical data currently being collected by the RTU in each 
substation, thus, guaranteeing its delivery to the control center via SCADA. 
Each substation will count on a local substation processor (LSP) for the 
information received from the WMSN at the transmission lines connected to it. The 
purpose of the processor is to handle the different modes of operation of the WMSN, 
execute message processing; and perform data validation and analysis. 
The inherent lineal characteristic of a transmission line drives the overall topology 
of the sensor network. Communications between nodes in such a topology are 
reduced to their adjacent node and at most two hops ahead (communications range 
permitting). Substations at the end point of the transmission line will have direct 
communication with the first (and second) adjacent structure. Thus, for messages 
originating from a node in the middle of the line to reach the substation, they should 
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be relayed through all the intermediate nodes. The overall architecture for the 
WMSN is shown in Figure 14. 
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The construction characteristics of transmission lines, with supports separated 
hundreds or even thousands of feet between each other pose a hard constraint for 
the range requirement for wireless communications between sensor nodes localized 
on different structures. By design, the communications range of the smart sensors is 
not very long and extending it is not efficient due to power supply limitations. 
A two layers model is proposed to overcome the restrictions imposed by the 
range/energy management issue on the sensor nodes. By providing a local data & 
communications processor (LDCP) on top of each support, the sensor nodes 
installed there could communicate with it, forming a local sensor group (LSG) with 
required communication ranges not greater than 100 feet given the dimensions of 
typical transmission line supports (Figure 2). Sensor data on every LSG is 
aggregated and analyzed for verification purposes on the LDCP. Data verification is 
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possible thanks to the inherent relation between the sensed variables, as was 
discussed in Chapter 3. Therefore, some data cross checking and structure health 
assessment can be done locally on each tower. Sensors on the LSG and the 
corresponding LDCP form the Layer 1 of the WMSN. It should be noted that there 
will be multiple instances of the Layer 1, one at each support. 
Support to support communications and collaboration rely on the LDCP on top of 
the structure. The interaction between all the LDCPs on the supports is the basis for 
the Layer 2 of the WMSN and forms the inter-support communications and 
collaboration (ISCC) Layer. In this layer all the message processing and 
transmission required for delivering the mechanical status information to the 
substation occurs. Figure 15 shows the conceptual two layers model depicting two 
adjacent structures. 
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An advantage of implementing a local data and communications processor 
(LDCP) on each structure is that it can avoid the range limitations of the sensor 
nodes. Its radio can achieve a larger range and count with an increased 
communications bandwidth due to the fact that it do not have size and power 
constraints. For that matter, it can harvest power from an inductive source placed 
near the closest phase conductor and can also count with a bigger rechargeable 
battery. The normal range expected for the application varies from 300 to 1500 feet, 
using more powerful radios in particular structures where longer spans (up to 3000 ft) 
exist for special crossings. 
Time response characteristics and requirements 
Failures in the transmission system that involve grounding of phase conductors, 
or contact between them, induce short circuits that require to be cleared in the 
shortest possible time. Electrical protection equipment has been used since the 
inception of the electric grid for taking the appropriate corrective actions in a fast, 
selective and reliable manner. Common response times for clearing faults are in the 
order of 50 to 100 ms [3]. Therefore, for the WMSN to be a plausible tool to carry out 
protective functions and provide fault signaling with adequate timing, messages from 
the faulted element should reach the substation in about 50 - 100 ms through the 
WMSN. This is an almost impossible requirement for today's technology, because of 
limitations on bandwidth and processing speed at LDCPs. Hence, it is concluded 
that the WMSN will not be required to provide principal or backup protective 
functionality. 
In the lower bound of the time requirements appear the SCADA (Supervisory 
Control and Data Acquisition) system which will be discussed in the following 
chapter. It collects information from the substations typically every 4 seconds. 
Therefore, it would be desirable that the local substation processor (LSP) at the 
substation achieve at most one overall diagnostic of its supervised lines for every 
SCADA cycle. 
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Given the latter requisites, it is expected that the total time for delivering a 
complete information package from one end of the line to the other, plus the 
processing time at the substation, should not exceed the SCADA cycle time. 
The total time for message delivery can be calculated with the following 
formulation: 
tline = (t hop + t proc ). nhop 
Where: 
t1ine : Total time from transmitting a message from one end of the line to the other 
t11.0p : Time required for a message to travel one hop (support to support) 
tproc : Processing time at each LDCP at the supports 
nhop: Number of hops on the line 
And: 
Where: 
lmsg : Message Length 
r: Communications bandwidth 
Given that there are some variables in the previous formulation that can be 
manipulated and others that are not, some important conclusions can be drawn. The 
number of hops is fixed, and it is directly related to the number of support structures 
in the line. The processing time is commonly various orders of magnitude inferior to 
the hop time given the actual speeds of mainstream microprocessors. Thus, the hop 
time is the driving variable for obtaining proper communication times. At the same 
time, the hop time is the result of the amount of bandwidth used by the message. 
Therefore, by establishing a proper ratio between the size of the message and the 
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available communications bandwidth, the transmission time requirements could be 
achieved. 
Operating modes 
In this work, a method is proposed to enable collaboration between LDCPs in 
adjacent supports as well as collecting data from all the LDCPs in a transmission 
line that involves sequential message broadcasting across the line. For executing 
both functions, two modes of operation (Parlial mode and Full mode) are proposed 
for the wireless mechanical sensor network. 
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Both modes rely on the sequential transmission of status messages by the LDCP 
in each support. In the proposed operating principle, a trigger LSP in one substation 
commands the start of a data collection sweep across the transmission line, 
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interrogating the first LDCP (mounted in support 1, as shown in Figure 14). The 
message control header will contain the parameters indicating if the sweep 
corresponds to partial or full operation mode, thus, instructing the LDCP what kind of 
processing to apply to its contents and its own data from the LSG. Figure 16 
presents the proposed message contents. Directionality is achieved by including the 
sender and receiver address in the message header. This way, when substation A in 
the far left initiates a sweep, it places a zero value on the sending node address and 
1 as the receiving node. This will instruct LDCP1 to process the message and 
broadcast it to the next one, setting 1 as the sending and 2 as the receiving 
addresses. This process will continue until the sweep reaches the substation B LSP. 
Then, LSP6 will trigger data collection sweep in the opposite direction, by placing its 
address (n+ 1) as the sending node and n as the receiving node. 
The message body will contain one vector of data values and another with the 
associated addresses of the sensor nodes from which those values come. The size 
of the vector depends on the operating mode, being larger for full mode and reduced 
for partial mode. 
Partial (Fast) Mode: In the . partial mode, messages exchanged by the LDCPs 
contain only a reduced set of the total data present on every LSG. As an example, 
the set can contain all the sensing information from the previous LDCP and the 
maximum value of each variable group (vibration, strain and temperature) 
accompanied with its associated sensor localization. In consequence, the size of the 
message will be small enough to provide high communication speeds. In this 
manner, various complete line sweeps could be executed within one SCADA cycle. 
When the message reaches the next LDCP, it will compare the values on the 
message with its own variables in the LSG. If there is some degree of concordance, 
the LDCP will select for transmission the maximum between its own variables and 
the ones in the message. If there is a notorious discordance, it will request a data 
collaboration session with the previous LDCP for validity checking using the 
expected relation between sensor information. If the cross validation for 
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tension/strain and vibration in the conductors fail , it is a signal of possible bad data, 
and a full mode sweep should be requested , inducing complete validation at the LSP. 
If the validation for temperature fails it can signal the presence of a hot spot. 
The data collaboration session is implemented by establishing a local peer to 
peer, full data exchange of the variables in each LSG. 
Full (Slow) Mode: The full mode collects the status information from all the 
sensors in the transmission line, enabling the local substation processor (LSP) to 
obtain a complete picture of the mechanical status of the line. Since the message 
size on this mode is bigger than in the partial mode, bandwidth utilization is also 
larger. For that reason, it should be expected that end to end transmission times 
increment various order of magnitude above the transmission time of the partial 
mode. 
The reason for collecting all the sensor data from the field with the full mode of 
operation is to provide the local substation processor (LSP) with a complete picture 
of the mechanical health of the transmission line. With it, the LSP can execute 
verification algorithms oriented to detect any inconsistencies within the collected 
data. The previously proposed "Mechanical State Estimator" for transmission lines 
could be the algorithm of choice. 
Failure detection of any LDCP is provided by means of implementing a timeout 
function in the preceding LDCP and using it as follows: 
• When starting a data collection sweep, the initiating substation will place its 
address (0 or n+ 1) in the broken link field of the message. 
• LDCPk-1 broadcast a message to LDCPk by placing k-1 in the sender node 
field of the message and k as the receiving node. At the same time, it starts a 
timeout clock. 
• The message from LDCPk-1 reach LDCPk and it then executes the local 
process and broadcast the modified message setting k as the sending node 
and k+ 1 as the receiving node. 
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• Since the broadcast is not directional, LDCPk-1 will receive an instance of the 
message from LDCPk to LDCPk+1· 
• If the message from LDCPk to LDCPk+1 is received by LDCPk-1 within the 
established timeout time, it will stop the clock and wait until a new processing 
request arrives. 
• If the message does not arrive in the time set, LDCPk-1 will mark node k as a 
broken link (setting k as the address in the broken link field of the message), 
and reversing the direction of the sweep by sending to LDCPk-2 a copy of the 
last message broadcasted to LDCPk. 
In this way, when a LSP receives a return message with an address different 
from zero or n+ 1 in the broken link field, it will know that there is a failure in the 
referenced node. Then , the centralized processor would receive concurrent 
notification from substations A and B about a broken link in the communication path. 
This could lead to further analyses for establishing if there was in fact a mechanical 
event (from measurements around the broken link) or just a LDCP failure. 
Having complete observation of the entire line, the LSP can perform more 
extensive analyses about the health status of the line. As a result, the local 
substation processor (LSP) can determine the mechanical status of the line, and 
classify it as one of the four proposed possible conditions: 
• Normal 
• Suspicious 
• Imminent 
• Fault 
The proposed conditions will be discussed in Chapter 6 when dealing with the 
different mechanical/electrical failure modes expected to be present at any time in a 
particular transmission line. 
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Another operation mode could be implemented using the same operation 
principle and message structure. In this case an exception driven transmission is 
proposed, in which, when a determined LDCP registers a significant change (above 
or below predetermined thresholds) in any of its monitored variables, it will broadcast 
a new message in both directions. Then, since the LSP in each substation maintains 
a virtual model of the transmission line and all of the LDCP and LSG, it can evaluate 
the mechanical health conditions of the transmission line at any moment from the 
received messages from all the broadcasting nodes. A drawback of this approach is 
that when there is a damaged node, it will not be noticed directly by the LSP, 
because there is no transmission being broadcasted from it, therefore, regular 
interrogation will still be needed for failure control. A combination of the proposed 
operation modes could be implemented for taking advantage of the benefits 
provided from each approach. 
CHAPTER 5. THE ENERGY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM 
SIMULATOR 
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The energy management system (EMS) is the core of every power system 
control center. These hardware and software packages collect operational data from 
all the substations in the power system, filter the measurements for bad data or 
communications errors and present the operator with a set of tools using this refined 
data. This enables the operator to perform analysis on the current state of the power 
system and determine its future behavior. 
In order to evaluate the feasibility of using the information from the WMSN for 
providing recommendations in real time to the operators in the control center, it was 
desired to use a simulator for the operation of the power system in real time. The 
dispatcher training simulator (DTS), or e-terra Simulator, from Areva T&D provides 
this functionality. The e-terra simulator emulates the SCADA/EMS system with no 
difference with the actual tools in any control center, as a result, providing a 
complete electrical picture of the simulated power system in real time. References 
[42] - [46] provide the complete documentation of the Areva EMS and DTS systems. 
An abridged version will be presented in this chapter for completeness. 
The e-terra SCADA subsystem 
The basic functionality of the EMS system is provided by the e-terra SCADA 
subsystem, managing the data acquisition and supervisory control capabilities for 
real-time monitoring and control of the power system. It gathers the power system's 
state variables from the field and presents them to the operators through one-line 
and tabular displays. The SCADA subsystem also enables operators to control 
devices in the field from the control center. 
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Figure 17. Substation data collection 
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In the field, every substation includes a remote terminal unit (RTU) which collects 
the state variables of the power system in the substation level at any given point in 
time as shown in Figure 17. The collected variables are: 
• Bus voltages. 
• Active and reactive power flows. 
• Circuit breaker and disconnecter status (open/close) . 
• Transformer taps positions. 
• Protection devices operating flags. 
The data collected is then relayed at predetermined intervals (usually 4 seconds) 
to the SCADA processor in the control center through the communication structure 
provided by the system. Once it reaches the SCAD A processor, the data undergo 
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standard val idation functions including quality and limit checking, alarming and 
calculation triggering. Then, it is stored in the real-time SCADA database. 
The SCADA database maintains an up-to-date picture of the monitored system 
which allows real-time observation of the state of monitored devices using the 
tabular or one-line displays. In the e-terra platform, the SCADA database is called 
SCADAMOM. The data collected by the RTUs is classified as one of the three major 
types of power system information that the database can hold: 
• Analog Values: are numeric values representing the state of variable-state 
devices, such as power lines, transformers, generating units, etc. Once they 
are retrieved from the RTU , they are converted, checked against reasonably 
limits and placed in the database. The value is then compared against 
operative limits, generating alarms when violated. Analog values are stored in 
ANALOG records in the database. 
• Status Values: represent the state of discrete-state devices, such as circuit 
breakers, disconnectors, tap changers, etc. The status values can be simple 
on/off or open/close inputs or a combination of inputs from a three-state 
device. When status changes are detected, alarms are generated if 
appropriate. Status values are stored in POINT records within the 
SCADAMOM database. 
• Count Values: are values originated in pulse accumulators. They are often 
used to measure the total amount of energy (MWh), liquid or gas that has 
passed by a specific location of the monitored system in a determined period 
of time. Count values are stored in COUNT records in the database. 
The supervisory control capabilities enable the operation of power system 
devices in the field. Operations like open or close a circuit breaker, change the tap 
position of a transformer or change control set points are among the mostly used in 
practice. 
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The e-terra SCADA subsystem supports receiving data from the e-terra simulator 
instead of the RTUs from the field. It then processes the data and makes it available 
to the SCADAMOM clients. The e-terra SCADA handles control requests issued 
from the e-terra simulator in a special manner also, thus, the e-terra simulator can 
simulate changes to the system in a closed loop fashion. 
The e-terra Generation subsystem 
The e-terra Generation Subsystem provides functionality for managing the 
generation associated with the control areas monitored by the EMS system. It 
consists of real-time and study functions. The real-time functions include automatic 
generation control (AGC), transaction scheduling and load forecasting. The study 
functions permit conducting economic dispatch and short term transactions 
(Economy-A) analysis. 
The real-time functions are provided by the RTGEN application of the EMS 
system. It allows the operator to monitor, analyze and control real-time generation 
within a control area, or within multiple control areas. 
The principal function of RTGEN is automatic generation control (AGC). The 
automatic generation control is a closed-loop control algorithm that provides 
generation control based on three major objectives [48]: 
• Maintain the system frequency inside a small band around the specified 
nominal value (60Hz). 
• Maintain the established values for the power interchanges between control 
areas. 
• Maintain each unit's generation at the most economic value. 
In order to achieve the proposed goals, the AGC determines the appropriate 
changes in the generation based on the current frequency, load and interchange 
conditions and sends control pulses to the local plant controllers, commanding the 
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increase or decrease of power generation. This process is executed periodically, 
usually every 8 seconds. 
The e-terra Transmission subsystem 
The e-terra Transmission subsystem provides applications supporting real-time 
and study mode network analysis for determining the state of a power system 
network, its level of security and how the level of security and economics of the 
network can be improved. The mostly used components included in the transmission 
subsystem are: 
• Real Time network analysis (Topology processing and state estimation). 
• Contingency analysis. 
• Security enhancement algorithms (Constrained dispatch , contingency 
planning and preventive action). 
• Short circuit analysis. 
• Voltage - Reactive power dispatch. 
• Power flow and Optimal power flow. 
• Outage scheduler. 
• Transfer limits calculation. 
The e-terra Simulator subsystem 
The e-terra Simulator provides an off line representation of the monitored power 
system that can be used to simulate its real time operation and control in the energy 
control center. It uses the same interfaces and is composed of much of the same 
software as the real-time EMS. It is originally intended for supplying a realistic 
environment to system dispatchers in training for practicing various operating tasks 
under both normal and emergency conditions. For this thesis, the e-terra simulator is 
used for providing real-time simulation of the power system as a test bed for the 
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integration of mechanical health information from the WMSN. Figure 18 presents a 
depiction, taken from [46], of the e-terra Simulator functionality and components. 
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Figure 18. e-terra Simulator functionality and components 
The e-terra simulator uses a power system dynamical model to create a 
simulated operating environment. The model contains a detailed description of the 
components and topology of the system; and a set of schedules for modeling the 
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future status of energy transactions, generation, loads, and circuit breakers. The 
state of the transmission system is calculated by successive Newton's method 
power flows, usually every 2 to 8 seconds, and their results are used to update the 
SCADAMOM database after each iteration. IEEE standard long term dynamics 
models are used to simulate the dynamic behavior of the generating units' prime 
movers. Thus, transient responses and inter-machine oscillations are not modeled. 
The e-terra simulator also includes protection relay models for simulating the action 
of over current, over/under voltage, over/under frequency and synchro-check relays. 
The e-terra PC Link 
The e-terra PC link is a tool provided by the e-terra Habitat environment of the 
AREVA EMS that enables communication between the EMS/DTS databases and 
external applications running under Microsoft Windows. This functionality is provided 
by the dynamic data exchange (DOE) service of windows through the execution of 
the HABDDE program of the AREVA platform. Complete information about the e-
terra PC link can be found in [47]. 
The IPSS software build as part of this thesis work makes use of the Windows 
DOE service for exchanging information with the e-terra PC Link tool in real time. 
The EMP60 test system 
The e-terra platform provides a 60 buses test system which contains all the 
information required to properly execute the e-terra simulator. The data is stored in 
databases containing the network topology (NETMOM), the SCADA model 
(SCADAMOM), the Generation model (GENMOM) and the DTS model (DTSMOM). 
The EMP60 model was used for power system simulation purposes in this thesis 
work. The system includes complete substations and generation plants configuration. 
For analysis purposes, a simplified representation of the EMP60 test system was 
developed and is show in Figure 19. 
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The test system consist of three control areas: EAST, WEST and EGAR, of 
which, area EAST has been designed as the main control area. The system has a 
peak load of 6, 100 MW and generation capacity of 10,865 MW. The load profile of 
each area is shown in Table 7. 
Table 7. Load profile for the EMP60 model 
Area Minimum Load Maximum Load [MW] [MW] 
EAST 612 919 
WEST 2209 3244 
EGAR 1165 1947 
Total Load 3986 6110 
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The generation units and plant controllers associated with each operating area 
are shown in Table 8. 
Table 8. Generation resources in the EMP60 model 
Control Area Plant Unit MVA Minimum Maximum Rated MW MW 
DOUGLAS_31 :CT1 _CCYC DOUGLAS:CT1 _COMB_CYC 50 10 50 
"----,~-~~-,---~-
DOUGLAS_31 :CT2_CCYC DOUGLAS:CT2_COMB_CYC 50 10 50 
~~~~~~--~~~------~--~~ 
DOUGLAS_31 :DB-A DOUGLAS:G1 800 50 1000 
•mm.--,,~~-wmN~~----'•wm•--~----~--~--·--- • 
______ ., _______ _ 
DOUGLAS_31 :DB-B DOUGLAS:G2 800 50 
~~~~~---~~~~~- -~--~·~~~~~--~~ EAST 700 
DOUGLAS_31 :ST _CCYC DOUGLAS:ST _COMB_CYC 40 10 40 
HEARN:G1 600 50 
HEARN_ 31 :HRN1 
HEARN:G2 600 50 
500 
500 
LAKEVIEW31:LV1 _CONTROLLER LAKEVIEW:GEN1 _GENERATOR 800 50 
----·-------·--·----------·-·----~·~·- ·------
700 
825 
WEST 
EGAR 
BVILLE 31 :BV1 
WVILLE_ 31 :WV1 
CHENAUX_31 :CHX1 
CHFALLS_31:CF1 
HOLDEN_ 31 :HD1 
NANTCOKE31 :NC1 
BVILLE:1 900 0 
WVILLE:1 1000 50 925 
CHENAUX:1 1300 50 1100 
CHFALLS:1 800 50 700 
----·-·-· ---·-.---.. --.---·---·· .... --,----· ----
CHFALLS:2 900 0 825 
HOLDEN: 1 2200 50 2000 
NANTCOKE:1 1100 50 950 
Simulated events on the DTS system 
Since the existing simulation tools for power systems, like the e-terra simulator, 
model only the electrical behavior of the underlying transmission infrastructure, 
mechanical failures are only relevant when their occurrence alter the electrical 
variables of the system. As was discussed in Chapter 3, when there is a severe 
mechanical failure, it is highly probable the occurrence of a short circuit and its direct 
result is the outage of the failed transmission line. The consequent topology change 
can trigger additional problems in the network such as overloads, voltage drop or 
angular instability. In the following simulation cases, a generation scenario was 
established in the EMP60 model to simulate overloads and islanding conditions after 
the outage of the line Martdale - Ceylon 345 kV. 
A case in which the system evolves to a normal state after the outage of the line 
Martdale - Ceylon 345 kV is shown next. Refer to Figure 19 and Appendix A for a 
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complete description of the EMP60 model. The direct effect of the outage of the line 
Martdale - Ceylon 345 kV is the overload of the line Chenaux - Picton 345 kV to 
711 MVA, as can be seen in the pre and post fault conditions shown in Figure 20 
and Figure 21. However, since the transfer limit of the line is 700 MVA, only a minor 
shift in generation is required for returning to normal transfer conditions. The 
evolution of the voltages, line flows and frequency are shown in Figure 22 to Figure 
24. 
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Figure 20. Pre-fault conditions 
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Figure 21 . Post-fault conditions after the outage of the line Martdale-Ceylon 345 kV, 
Chenaux-Picton 345 kV at 101 % load 
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Figure 22. Voltage evolution - Normal case 
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Figure 23. Line Flows - Normal case 
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Figure 24. AGC status - Normal case 
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In the previous case, the interchange between the ECAR and WEST areas was 
800 MW. Increasing it to 1000 MW and simulating the outage of the line Martdale -
Ceylon 345 kV which could be envisioned as a loss of a line due to mechanical 
factors, produces the overload of the line Chenaux - Picton 345 kV to 843 MVA 
(125%), as shown in Figure 25. In this situation, the operating procedures 
recommend trying to reclose the outaged line, and if it is not possible, the system 
should be driven to a secure state. 
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Figure 25. Post fault conditions after the outage of the line Martdale-Ceylon 345 kV, 
Chenaux-Picton 345 kV at 120% load 
However, if in the time spent for reclosing the line an additional outage occurs in 
Chenaux - Picton 345 kV due to its overloaded condition, the system evolves to the 
state shown in Figure 26. There could be a variety of causal events for the undesired 
outage of the overloaded line: Hidden failures, operation of overload relays earlier 
than expected or excessive sag inducing a short circuit. As will be shown next, this 
68 
anomaly triggers a cascading event that would produce a collapse in the power 
system, or its islanding in the worst of the cases. Any action oriented to reduce the 
power flow in an overloaded line taken at the appropriate time, will help to avoid the 
consequences of its undesired tripping. 
If there are no additional outages, or if the subsequently overloaded lines are not 
tripped by their protection devices, the power system experiences a voltage collapse 
as shown in Figure 27-Figure 28. The AREVA DTS simulator indicates a collapse 
condition by the lack of convergence of the power flow. In this case, the message 
log of the power system model of the DTS stated that there were generalized low 
voltage conditions during the time after the outage of Chenaux - Picton 345 kV and 
before the non-convergent power flow. 
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Figure 26. Post fault conditions after the outage of the line Chenaux-Picton 345 kV 
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Figure 27. Voltage evolution - Collapse case 
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Figure 28. Line flows - Collapse case 
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If appropriate supplementary protective measures are taken, the system would 
avoid collapse by islanding the area ECAR after the second outage. In the following 
simulation , the line Redbridg-Holden 345 kV was instructed to open immediately 
after the outage of the line Chenaux - Picton 345 kV. Thus, the power system 
evolves to a state in which there are two isolated areas with unbalanced load and 
generation as shown in Figure 29 to Figure 33. The area ECAR will have excess 
generation and frequency over 60 Hz and the EAST and WEST areas will have 
excess load with frequency drop according to the unbalance presented. There are 
no under frequency load schemes modeled in the load of the EMP60, therefore, the 
evolution of the frequency in the EAST and WEST areas reflects only the dynamics 
of the load control provided by the governors of the generating units. The AGC in 
those areas is suspended due to the high value of the ACE as shown in Figure 33 . 
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Figure 29. Post fault conditions after the outage of the line Chenaux-Picton 345 kV and 
Redbridg-Holden 345 kV 
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Figure 30. Voltage evolution - Islanding case 
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Figure 31 . Line flows - Islanding case 
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Figure 32. Frequency evolution - Islanding case 
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Figure 33. AGC status in area EAST after islanding 
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CHAPTER 6. PROPOSED TOOL FOR WMSN/EMS 
INTEGRATION 
Mechanical/Electrical system failure modes 
73 
The WMSN design proposed in Chapter 4 states that the LSP sends the 
mechanical health information of its related lines to the central processor with every 
SCADA cycle. Then, the central processor can analyze the mechanical health data 
from the two substations at the end of each line and establish a confirmed 
mechanical heath status for any particular line. 
As discussed in Chapter 3, the mechanical health status of a transmission line 
can be influenced by the environmental conditions and by human actions. Some 
differences can be drawn between those two influences by means of detecting the 
spatial and temporal characteristics of the measurements as proposed in that 
chapter. In the same way, the severity of the mechanical status can be established 
by comparing the values of the variables against the different limits defined by the 
design of the transmission line. As an example, the tension limits presented in Table 
3 can help determine appropriate thresholds for a mechanical health classification 
algorithm. 
This thesis proposes a classification of the mechanical health status of a 
transmission line based on the severity of the physical conditions as follows: 
Normal 
In this condition, there is no indication of variables outside the normal operating 
limits. Tensions in the conductors attached to strain supports are inside the design 
parameters and are balanced in conductors attached to suspension supports. 
Vibrations are minimal, all the structures are in vertical position and the 
temperatures are inside normal operating temperatures, without appreciable 
74 
differences between close temperature sensors. An integer status value of 0 is 
assigned to this condition. 
Suspicious 
In this condition, some of the measured variables stray just outside from the 
normal range assigned to them. Ice accretion, strong winds or maximum thermal 
loading can be events associated with this status. As an example, referring to Table 
3, tension sensors indicate values below 70% of the established limits for ACSR 
conductors. There could be indication of vibration in the conductors and supports. 
Inclinometers and accelerometers in the structures detect small tilt angles. There 
could also be indications of temperatures in the conductors close to the thermal 
limits. An integer status value of 1 is assigned to this condition. 
Imminent 
In this condition, several of the measured variables in the transmission line cross 
the thresholds established for detecting mechanical problems. However, there is no 
clear indication of a mechanical failure. Tensions are above 70% of the limit, high 
vibration levels are detected and structure's tilt angles are measurably apart from the 
vertical. Temperatures in the conductors are appreciably above the normal thermal 
limits or there could be indications of hot spots. Although an indication of failure is 
not present, this condition deserves attention from the power system operator since 
it could be an indication that there can be an electrical failure and/or a network 
topology change some time soon. An integer status value of 2 is assigned to this 
condition. 
Fault 
Mechanical failures can be detected by the WMSN in different ways, by the 
excursion out of limits of some variables, by values near to zero in others or by the 
complete lack of signal from the sensors. Tension sensors at strain structures can 
indicate a broken conductor by detecting abnormally high or low values, depending 
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on whether the failure is distant or close to the sensor. In suspension supports, 
tension sensors can detect abnormally high differences between them or values 
close two zero in both. Collapsed structures would be detected by tilt angles close to 
the horizontal. However, when there is a complete loss of signal from any of the 
sensors or from a LDCP, it is not clear if it corresponds to a failure of the sensor or a 
mechanical failure in the line. In this case, the dynamics previous to the event and 
the measurement from neighbor sensors can provide the LSP with sufficient 
information for classifying it. Additionally, and as discussed in Chapter 3, when a 
mechanical failure occurs, there is a high probability of the presence of an electrical 
failure in the system, thus, providing another source for verification. An integer status 
value of 3 is assigned to this condition. 
An xml data file produced by the central processor can supply the mechanical 
status information to the integration tool in charge of performing the network security 
analysis. A prototype is shown in Table 9. 
Table 9. Prototype of an xml data exchange file for the WMSN status 
<?xml version='l.0' encoding='IS0-8859-1' ?> 
<WMSNStatus> 
<BranchStatus Id='21' > 
<TimeStamp>Ol/03/2000 03:10:00</TimeStamp> 
<Status>O</StatUS> 
<WMSNinf o> 
<Tension LDCP='l68' Id='TS003' Units='lb'>6000</Tension> 
<Vibration LDCP='l69' Id='AOOl' Units='mg'>340</Vibration> 
<Temperature LDCP='331' Id='TOll' Units='F' HS='N'>l80< / Temperature> 
</WMSNinfo> 
<Dynamics>Wind</Dynamics> 
</BranchStatus> 
</ WMSNStatUS> 
Electrical faults in the transmission system can be produced by physical events 
which could be of temporary or permanent nature. In the case of temporary faults, 
they can be product of lightning, conductor sags, vegetation approach and/or contact. 
In this case there is a line trip due to relay action, but the physical event producing it 
is not present when there is intent to put the line in service again . There is no fault 
76 
indication from the mechanical sensor network, but probably signals of suspicious or 
imminent mechanical events. Permanent faults, in the other hand, are product of the 
occurrence of more drastic physical events like downed conductors (1-3), collapsed 
towers or poles, permanent vegetation contact, etc. In this case, there is a line trip 
due to relay action and there is a fault indication from the mechanical sensor 
network. 
For each of the different fault types, different actions need to be taken in the 
power system in order to avoid cascading events that could lead to a collapse of the 
interconnected power system. We are going to focus now to transmission overload 
management driven by the fault classification. For example: If a line trips and that 
event produces an overload in another transmission line, the fault classification can 
provide two ways to handle the event. For a Temporary Fault, the recommended 
actions are to wait and try to reclose the faulted line in a few minutes due to the 
purely electrical nature of the fault. But for a Permanent Fault, the recommendation 
begins with blocking any further reclosure and start immediately the recovering 
process that can include generation shifting and/or load shedding. 
Network sensitivity factors 
The real time operation requirement for the proposed tool sets a constraint on the 
amount of calculations that can be executed for assessing the state of the combined 
electrical and mechanical subsystems. For this task, linear methods are the most 
appropriate due to their speed of calculation. However, by using a linear 
representation of the power system they only provide approximate results of the 
condition of the system in a determined state. 
The DC Power Flow is a simplified version of the decoupled Power Flow problem 
in which it removes the V-Q equations, and assumes all node voltages equal to the 
nominal (1.0 pu), thus providing a linear set of equations of the form: 
p = B'. B 
Where: 
B~. = ~-1 
ll L...i 
J=t xii 
B' 1 . . .. = -- l-:/:- J lj 
x .. 
lj 
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The power flows through the branches (Lines and Transformers) of the network 
are then calculated as: 
1 fz =~1 =-(Bi -8) x .. y 
A byproduct of the DC power flow formulation is the possibility for obtaining 
network sensitivity factors. Wood and Wollenberg [48] propose a set of network 
sensitivity factors using linear relationships that can be drawn between active power 
injections at the nodes and the active power flows in the branches of the network, 
based on the formulation of the DC power flow as: 
- -118 = X · 11P 
Where: 
X =[B'r1 
The generation shift distribution factor ( GSDF) for a branch connecting buses m 
and n with respect to the injection at node i can be obtained by: 
11fz 1 
ali =AD =-(Xni -Xmi) 
Llii x, 
The resultant generation shift distribution factor represents the change of the 
power flowing in branch I due to the change in the power injected at node i. It also 
can be understood as how much of the power injected at a determined node (i) will 
flow through the branch (/) being evaluated. 
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In a similar manner, the line outage distribution factor (LODF) for a branch 
connecting buses m and n after the outage of the branch k between nodes i and j 
can be obtained by: 
xk 
-(X . -X . -X . +X . ) 
A . .f m Jn tm 1m 
d = _D.J_ .1 = _x_, _________ _ 
L,k f k0 xk( X nn -Xmm -2X nm) 
In this case, the line outage distribution factor represents the change of the 
power flowing in branch l due to the removal of the branch k from the network. 
As proposed in [48], superposition can be applied for calculating the effect of 
changes of the power injections in different nodes and/or outages of lines thanks to 
the linear nature of the sensitivity factors. A particular calculation used in this thesis 
combines the GSDF and LODF sensitivity factors for obtaining a modified GSDF for 
a branch l after the eventual outage of the monitored line k. In this case, the 
formulation for the new GSDF is: 
Obtaining recommendations for alleviating line overloads 
By using the network sensitivity factors presented in the previous section , and 
taking advantage of their linear nature, the most contributing power injections to a 
line flow can be identified by examining the resultant GSDF vector for a particular 
line. As noted before, the GSDF vector for each line contains the relative 
contribution of each injection to the flow of the line, taking into account that any 
change in the power injection is compensated by a change in the opposite direction 
by the reference node. 
For determining the most contributing combination of injection increase and 
decrease, it is necessary to identify first the node with the maximum value of GSDF 
in the original GSDF vector as: 
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Then , the GSDF of each node referenced to the pivot is obtained by: 
pivot _ 
a li - a ,i - a l,pivot 
Once it is established, the most contributing combination of injections can be 
selected by taking the previously obtained pivot node and the maximum value of the 
new GSDFpivot vector (opposite node 1). In the same manner, the second most 
contributing combination is identified by selecting the second largest (opposite 2) 
and the second smallest (pivot 2) values of the GSDFpivot vector. We propose to use 
the previously identified set of four nodes for determining the appropriate changes in 
their injections for managing the overload in a particular line, having that the 
generation in neither of those nodes is involved in the AGC function. In such case, 
the next largest or smallest node will be selected. 
The direction of generation change for each node depends on the signs of both 
the line power flow and the GSDF vector. When the opposite 1 and opposite 2 
nodes have the same sign as the line flow, they have to decrease generation in 
order to alleviate the overload. When they have different signs, they have to 
increase generation. The pivot and pivot 2 nodes change generation in the opposite 
direction of the opposite nodes. 
Once the changing nodes are identified, the generation allocation for each 
direction of change (up or down) that would provide the fastest overload relief in the 
line can be established. Using the ramp parameter of the generating unit in a node, 
the reflected rate of change of the power flow in a line caused by the change in the 
generation is given by: 
Rampzi =au · Rampi 
Then, the contributions of the generating units selected in each direction (up or 
down set) are combined. The change of flow in the line, relative to the contribution of 
the ramp of each generation in the set is found by: 
R up/down ~-f ~p/down = a mpli ~-{ 
Y !1 ~ R up/down Y l 
L.J ampu 
j 
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From the definition of the generation shift distribution factor, the change in each 
generation required to alleviate the overload is given by: 
~+ up/ down 
~pup/down =-Y_ili __ 
l 
a li 
Then, by substitution and simplification: 
R up/down ~pup/down = ampi ~-{ 
l L a lj . Ramp~pldown y l 
j 
Given the linear nature of the network sensitivity factors , the recommendations 
calculated by the previous formulation are not exact. The resultant line overload 
relief in the actual power system could bring the line close to the loading limit, but at 
a value slightly over or below it. If the calculations are done in an iterative fashion, i.e. 
every AGC cycle, the inaccuracies inherent to the linear representation can be 
reduced. Using this approach, the recommended incremental change in generation 
for each unit at every cycle (with time step T) is given by: 
M up l down 
MJ~p/down = __ i __ _ 
' T 
Since Rampli provides the rate of change of the power flow in the line due to the 
change in generation (up or down) in node i, then , for each direction, 
~fz =~Ramp . ~t ~ It 
l 
represents the rate of change of the power flow in the line due to all the 
generation changes in one direction (up or down). By selecting the smallest absolute 
value between the calculations for Up and Down generators, it is possible to obtain 
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the expected speed of overload relief. Thus, the time required for overload relief can 
be calculated as: 
~t = min / t · ~I' ( ~j Up ~J Down) ~t ' ~f ~ I 
The /PSS software 
A Visual C++ program was developed for implementing the generation shift 
strategy described in the previous section. The integrated power system security 
(/PSS) program performs the real-time assessment of the mechanical/electrical 
situation collecting the power system's electrical status data from the AREVA e-terra 
Platform and the mechanical status information from the WMSN. 
The interface with the AREVA e-terra platform is built on the DOE service 
provided by Microsoft Windows, using AREVA's HABDDE server. The interface with 
the WMSN is provided by an xml exchange file as shown in Table 9. 
The IPSS software implements a power system status algorithm that executes 
every 8 seconds, which collects the information from the EMS and WMSN and then 
calculates the generation shift recommendations. The algorithm's flowchart is 
presented in Figure 34. 
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Figure 34. Status processing flowchart 
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Unfortunately, we were not able to obtain the functionality for inserting the 
recommendations automatically back into the DTS. Therefore, the recommended 
generation changes need to be introduced manually through the generation 
management displays provided by the e-terra Simulator. AREVA is working on the 
external data processor software that would provide that functionality. Once it is 
available, the status processing algorithm can implement the incremental changing 
strategy proposed in the previous section, thus, reducing the inaccuracies of the 
manual approach. 
Simulation results 
The integrated operation of the IPSS software, Areva's DTS and the WMSN 
concept was tested on the EMP60 power system model, assuming that a wireless 
mechanical sensor network is installed in the line Martdale - Ceylon 345 kV for 
monitoring its mechanical health. 
The following simulations will model different mechanical failure modes in the 
monitored line and their associate dynamics. The interest is to verify the appropriate 
response and recommendations provided by the I PSS software as the power system 
is simulated in the dispatcher training simulator. 
Extreme mechanical conditions, no overloads 
In this simulation, the EMP60 system is operating at medium load. The 
simulation date and time is January 1, 2000 at 7:50 am. The interchange between 
areas ECAR and WEST is 650 MW. Figure 35 shows the initial conditions in the 
vicinity of the Chenaux - Picton 345 kV line. 
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Figure 35. Initial condition at 7:50 am 
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At this time, the system is in normal conditions, as shown in the IPSS display in 
Figure 36. 
r.~ EMP60.ipss - IPSS Model [J(Q](g) 
E_ie !;_dlt ~ t!elp 
Current nme: 1/3/2000 7:50:52 AM 
Monitoring Line: CEYlON_31 :MARTDALE31 : I 
[
Associated Breakers -
CE'rlON_ 31:4547 CLOSED 
MAATDALE31: 169170 CLOSED 
MARTDALE31:170!79 CLOSED 
EMS Status: CLOSED 
WMSN Status: NORMAL 
Ready 
r 
Inte(J' al System Status 
l ystem is in Normal Conditions 
---·------~ 
Recommendations-·----------~ 
No Recommendations at this time 
Figure 36. IPSS display for normal conditions 
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After receiving notification from the WMSN through the xml exchange file , the 
IPSS indicates the presence of suspicious and later imminent mechanical conditions 
on the line. However, after processing the electrical status of the transmission 
system and calculating the network sensitivity factors , the IPSS shows that there are 
no expected overloads, Figure 37 to Figure 38. 
(.11 EMP60.ipss - IPSS Model GJ(g](Rl 
Current Time: 1/3/20007:52:12 AM 
Monitoring Line: CEYLON_31:MARTDALE31:1 
r
Associated Breakers -1 
CE'T1.0N_ 31:4547 CLOSED 
MARTDALE31:169170 CLOSED l 
MARTDALE31:170179 CLOSED 
EMS Status: CLOSED 
WMSN Status: SUSPIGOUS 
Ready 
- Integral SystemStatus-----------
1 ~ystem is in Normal Concitions -- - ::J There are Suspicious mechanical conditions on the Line Monitored There are some probabilities for the line to be tripped 
r Recommendations ------------
There are no expected overloaded lines 
Figure 37. IPSS showing suspicious mechanical conditions, but no overloads 
,;~ EMP60.ipss - IPSS Model . GJ(g]l'.RJ 
Current Time: 1/3/2000 7:53:16 AM 
MonitorinQ Line: CEYLON_31 :MARTDALE31: I 
r Associated Breakers - -
CEYLON_31:4547 CLOSED 
MAR TDALE31: 169170 CLOSED 
MARTDALE3 l :170l79 CLOSED 
EMS Status: CLOSED 
WMSN Status: IJ'.f\1.INENT 
Ready 
Integral System Status---------
!
:system Is in Norm11I Concitions 
There are Extreme mechanical conditions on the Line Monitored 
There are high probabiities for the line to be tripped 
- ----------
r Recommendations-------- ----
There are no expected overloaded lines 
I 
Figure 38. IPSS showing imminent mechanical conditions, but no overloads 
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After simulating the consequential trip of the line Martdale - Ceylon 345 kV due 
to extreme mechanical conditions at 7:55:13 am, the system evolves to the condition 
shown in Figure 39. 
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Figure 39. Post fault conditions, no overloads 
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The IPSS display reflects the new condition of the power system (Figure 40), and 
Figure 41 presents the evolution of the flow in the tie lines before and after the 
outage of Martdale - Ceylon 345 kV. As can be seen, Chenaux - Picton 345 kV is 
slightly below its limit of 700 MVA after the outage, corroborating the calculation of 
the IPSS status processing algorithm. 
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E~e ~dil: '!iew t:!elp 
Current Time : I f3/2000 7: 55 : 17 AM 
MonitorinQ line: CEYLON_ 31:MAATDALE31:1 
Associated Breakers -
CE\'LON_ 31 :4547 OPEN 
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EMS Status: OPEN 
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Ready 
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J Recommendations -
There is an <W1Qular difference of -27.66 degrees 
J 
CA? f I 
Figure 40. IPSS display after the outage of Martdale - Ceylon 345 kV 
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Figure 41 . Line flows 
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Extreme mechanical conditions, overloaded elements 
For simulating the occurrence of overloads in the DTS, the active power 
interchange between areas EGAR and WEST is increased to 900 MW. The initial 
date and time is January 1, 2000 at 7:40 am. The initial condition is of the system is 
shown in Figure 42. 
.. 22a.1W 
564MW 
CHENAUX I • 3CMVAR +- 22.UVA 
7IMVAR 
56!MVA 
+ 21EMW 
't' l!MVAR 
+ 21!MVA 
149151 146148 
CHFALLS 
347.7 KV 
145149 147148 
+ ~ • 594M:W 
,,. 8(MVAR 't' 5tMVAR 
+ 123\iIVA • 591MVA 
+ 8EMW 
,,. lBVIVAR • 59CMVil 
+ 8!MVA 
"' 8:MVAR 
186187 • 59!'.MVA 
REDBRIDG I 7679 
7980 
186187 
+ 8EMW PICTON 
,,. lBVIVAR 
+ 8!MVA 7982 
Figure 42. Initial conditions at 7:40 am 
Starting from this initial condition, two different evolutions of the power system 
can be simulated. In the first one, a slow, progressive deterioration of the 
mechanical condition is simulated, and the operator executes the recommended 
generation shift actions before the monitored line trips. In the second, a faster 
evolution of the mechanical condition produces the outage of the monitored line; 
therefore, the operator takes corrective actions after the line is tripped. 
In the fi rst case, the IPSS receives notification from the WMSN, at 7:42:04 am, 
that there are suspicious mechanical conditions on the monitored line (Martdale -
89 
Ceylon 345 kV), but the line is still in operation . Then, it executes the status 
processing algorithm, which determines that the line Chenaux - Picton 345 kV can 
be overloaded if in fact Martdale - Ceylon 345 kV trips, and proposes a set of 
recommendations. However, for suspicious conditions, it is not advisable to execute 
the recommendations . They are presented for information only. Figure 43 shows the 
output of the IPSS for the condition being discussed. 
,?f EMP60.ipss - IPSS Model GJ§LRJ 
Current Time: 1/3/2000 7:42:04 AM 
Monitorino Line: CEVLON_31:MARTDALE31:1 
Associated Breakers 1 
CEYLON_31:4547 CLOSED 
MARTDALE31 : 169170 CLOSED 
MARTDALE31: 170179 CLOSED 
EMS Status: CLOSED 
WMSN status: SUSPIOOUS 
Ready 
System is in Normal Conditions - -
r 
Integral System Status -
There are Suspicious mechanical conditions on the Line Monitored 
There are some probabilities for the line to be tripped 
I Recommendations 
I !
Line PICTON_31 :CHENAUX_31:1 can be Overloaded-139.79 MW 
Recommended Actions: 
NANTCOKE31 :NC1 - Chanoe -79.25 MW to 451.07 MW 
0£NAUX_31:CHXI - Change -84.20 MW to 479 .08 MW 
1LAKEVIEW31 :Ll/l_CONTROLLER - Change 66.16 MW to 366.15 MW 
DOUGLAS_31 :DB-A- Chanoe 97 .31 MW to 498.13 MW 
Net Change in Line Flow is 172.42 MW/min 
c~~~o -
__ J 
Figure 43. IPSS presenting the recommendations for overload relief 
When the mechanical conditions further deteriorate, the IPSS notifies the 
operator as shown in Figure 44. Since there is the possibility of a permanent fault, 
the recommendations are implemented starting at 7:45:56 am. The IPSS calculates 
that the time required for bringing the line to a secure loading condition is 0.82 
minutes. Figure 45 to Figure 4 7 show the evolution of the line flows, generation and 
frequency for this case. 
The outage of Martdale - Ceylon 345 kV due to extreme mechanical conditions 
is simulated occurring at 7:50:09 am. Figure 45 shows that the final flow on Chenaux 
- Picton 345 kV is close to its limit of 700 MVA after the execution of the corrective 
recommendations and the subsequent trip of the monitored line. 
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Current Ttme: 1(3/2000 7:'13:'10 AM 
MonitorjruJ Line: CEYLON_31 :MARTDALE31 :1 
I 
Associated Breakers -
CEYLON_31:'1547 CLOSED 
MARTDALE31:169170 CLOSED 
MARTDALE31 :170179 CLOSED 
EMS Status: CLOSED 
WMSN Status: Iflt\lllf\ENT 
Ready 
Inte~al System Status 
System is in Normal Conditions 
JThere are Extreme mechanical condlions on the Line Monitored 
There are hiljl probabilities for the line to be tripped 
Recommendations 
Line PICTON_31:CHENAUX_31:1 can be Overloaded ·141 .79 MW 
Recommended Actions: 
1~:~~;:,'~; -~::e !s~!oM:wt~o4~8~~1M:W 
:LAKEVIEW°31:LV1_CONTROLLER -Change 67.10 MW to 367.10 MW 
DOUGLAS_31 :DB·A - Chanoe 96.70 MW to 498.49 MW 
Net ChanQe in Line Flow is 172.'12 MV>l/min 
Aleviation tine is 0.82 min ! '"'""""-'"·" MW/m" 
Figure 44. IPSS indicating an imminent mechanical failure 
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Figure 45. Line flows for relief before the line outage 
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Figure 46. Generation shift 
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Figure 47. Frequency evolution 
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The evolution plots of the line flows and the generation show that the time for 
overload alleviation predicted by the IPSS program (0.82 minutes) is close to the 
observed in the EMP60 model. Additionally, the IPSS's status processing algorithm 
detects a difference in the ramps of the recommended units of -128.38 MW/min 
(Figure 44 ). The frequency plot corroborates that result by showing an initial 
frequency drop, indicating that the decreasing units are faster than the increasing 
units. However, once the changes are finished, the frequency returns to values close 
to 60 Hz. 
When the mechanical conditions produce a sudden trip of the monitored line, the 
operator in the control center needs to change the operating point to a secure state 
as quickly as possible in order to avoid possible cascading events. To simulate this 
case, we start from the same initial conditions shown in Figure 42. The IPSS detects 
the presence of extreme mechanical conditions leading to a mechanical fault and the 
simultaneous outage of the line at 7:43:07 am, prompting the operator to take the 
recommended corrective actions (Figure 48). 
-~ EMP60.ipss - IPSS Model GJ(Q]L8) 
Current nme: 113/2000 7 :43:07 AM 
Mooitorin<;I Line: CEYLON_31 :MARTDALE31 : t 
Associated Breakers 
CEYLON_31 :4547 OPEN 
MARTDALE31 :169170 OPEN 
MARTDALE31 :170179 OPEN 
EMS status: OPEN 
WMSN Status: FAU. T 
Ready 
InteQral Systemstatus--------
~e Monitored is Open ere are incications rJ mechanical f ailt1e s not recommended to redose the Uie 
There is an anguar cifference of -33.69 degees 
Line PICTON 31 :CHENAUX 31 : I is Overloaded - 14 t. 98 MW 
Recommended Actions: -
NANTCOKE31 :NCI - Change -80 .49 MW to 451 .<19 MW ~ Recommendations 0£NAUX 31:CHXI - Change -85.52 MW to 481.20 MW LAKEVIEWJl :LVt_CONTROLLER ·Change 67. 19 MW to 368 .64 MW 
DOUGLAS_31 :DB-A · Change 98 .84 MW to 501 .17 MW 
Net Change n Line Flow is 172.42 ffl>l/mn 
Aleviation time is 0 .82 min 
Difference in Ramps is -128. 38 MW /min 
Figure 48 
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The system condition in the vicinity of Chenaux - Picton 345 kV after the outage 
of the monitored line is shown in Figure 49. 
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Figure 49. Post fault conditions, Chenaux - Picton 345 kV at 120% 
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Once the generation shift recommended by the IPSS is implemented, the system 
achieves a new quasi secure state in the time predicted (0.82 min). However, due to 
the inaccuracies inherent in the linear methodology, the resultant loading of the line 
Chenaux - Picton 345 kV is still over the allowed limit. The IPSS display shows the 
amount of overload and the actions required to take the line to 100% loading (Figure 
50). After taking the supplementary recommended actions, the overload of Chenaux 
- Picton 345 kV is relieved. Figure 51 - Figure 53 show the behavior of the main 
variables of the power system during the simulation. 
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E~e ~dit ~ !::!elp 
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I
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Figure 50 
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Figure 51 . Line flows showing relief actions 
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Figure 52. Generation shift 
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The results of the previous simulations demonstrate the benefits of implementing 
the wireless mechanical sensor network (WMSN) along with a power system 
security analysis application like the IPSS. By providing information about the 
permanent/temporal nature of a failure, the integration of the WMSN, the EMS 
system and the IPSS would help operators determine the appropriate actions 
required to avoid cascading events like those obtained in the simulations in Chapter 
5, where there is assumed that no WMSN is installed in the system. 
In the first simulation case there is no evidence of overloaded elements after the 
outage of the line Martdale - Ceylon 345 kV. Even though the WMSN is detecting 
the presence of potential mechanical problems, the IPSS estimates that the 
condition would evolve to a reduced risk state, and therefore does not offer 
recommendations. The first simulations of Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 corroborate this 
result. 
In the collapse and islanding cases of Chapter 5 it was shown that overload of 
the line Chenaux - Picton 345 kV was the driving factor of the cascading events 
leading to the final result. The second and third simulations of this chapter show that 
the use of the WMSN and the IPSS will help reduce the time that the line will be on 
the overloaded condition. In fact, if an imminent mechanical failure could be detected 
before an outage of the monitored line (Martdale - Picton 345 kV), the IPSS can 
command a reduction in the flow of the potentially overloaded line even before 
Martdale - Picton is opened. The consequence of this is that no overloads would 
appear in the system after the outage of the monitored line. 
In the case of an unexpected trip of a monitored line, which will be the case of a 
sabotage attack or a rapidly deteriorating environmental condition, the quick 
identification of a permanent fault gives the operators clear indication of the state of 
the system. They can proceed immediately to drive the system to a secure condition 
with the help of the recommendations offered by the I PSS. The benefit now is the 
reduction of the time in which the overloaded line stays in that condition, thus 
reducing the risk of an undesired trip. 
CHAPTER 7. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDED 
FUTURE WORK 
Conclusions 
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This thesis proposes a novel approach for using wireless sensor technology to 
assess the mechanical health of transmission lines. It is the first known proposed 
application for wide deployment of smart sensors in transmission lines. The set of 
smart sensors selected can provide the information required to detect a broad 
number of environmental and human related events affecting a particular section of 
a line. During the literature review, it was discovered that there are a number of 
relations between the measurements which can be exploited for obtaining improved 
selectivity and classification of the different mechanical events. Additionally, it was 
found that the dynamics of the mechanical events can also be a source for 
classifying between environmental occurrences, accidents or sabotage actions. 
The ability to apply the finite element theory on a reduced model of the 
transmission line supports the viability for the implementation of a mechanical state 
estimator for the information collected by the WMSN. 
Optimized maintenance practices can also be achieved by the analysis of the 
measurements provided by the proposed sensor system. Collected statistical 
information about stress and vibration in conductors can help maintenance 
engineers to optimally schedule maintenance, or pertorm preventive maintenance in 
lines with excess mechanical stress. The ability to detect hot-spots can provide 
surveyors with select locations to perform more thorough infrared analysis in 
structures. The statistical data and the correlation with confirmed faults can also 
supply the information for calculating failure probabilities. 
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The proposed two layers architecture provides a way to overcome the range 
limitation of the smart sensors installed in the supports, while offering a complete 
monitoring environment for a transmission line. The separation of the sensing and 
long distance communication functionalities makes way for the optimization of power 
management strategies, choosing the most appropriate for each application. 
The thresholds for determining the health status of the transmission lines depend 
on their particular design. Once that information is available, those thresholds can be 
supplied to the LSP for failure mode classification. 
The time response characteristics that can be obtained from the WMSN do not 
make it viable for fast acting applications like principal or backup protection. 
However, it is suitable for integration with the data acquisition functionality provided 
by the SCADA system. The proposed modes of operation enable the collaboration 
between LDCPs and the LSG in both fast and comprehensive manner. They also 
support the implementation of failure detection algorithms for the LDCPs. 
The proposed algorithm for overload relief is linear, but it was found that it 
provides good approximations for the final loading of the lines. The fact that it can be 
executed in real time permits the implementation of automatic overload relief 
algorithm using a predetermined set of the generating units available. 
The simulation results obtained for a system condition in which are expected 
overloads, show that the recommended actions produce the same results when 
taken before or after the occurrence of an outage of the monitored line. Likewise, the 
simulations show that the time predicted by the IPSS for overload relief is a good 
approximation of the time taken in the actual power system. 
The integration of the WMSN and the EMS through the IPSS provides a viable 
tool for quick assessment of the permanent/temporal nature of a failure, permitting a 
fast correction of the emergency status of the system. Probably the most evident 
benefit of installing a WMSN in a transmission line is the ability to provide an early 
warning system for catastrophic failures when the system is in a highly stressed 
situation. 
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Recommended future work 
Since this is the first approach to the application of wireless sensor technology to 
transmission lines, there is still a huge amount of research that needs to be done in 
order to make this technology practical. Some of our insights about the next steps 
required to achieve that goal are listed next: 
• More analysis needs to be performed for optimizing the placement of 
sensors in the structures. Involvement of the civil engineering department 
into the project could be of great help. 
• It is necessary to evaluate the effect of the induced magnetic and 
electrical fields produced by the transmission lines in the integrity of the 
communications of the WMSN. It is required to analyze the possible 
interferences due to this effect. 
• It is suggested the development of a reduced scale transmission line test 
bed for research on the relationship between the different variables 
proposed to be monitored. 
• Research on the proposed Mechanical State Estimator needs to be 
accomplished for providing a tool for integration and validation check of 
the measurements coming from the WMSN. 
• It is required to integrate into the analysis the issue of sensor durability 
given their deployment in potentially harsh environments. The design of 
appropriate enclosures could guarantee their integrity for extended 
deployment times without intervention. 
• The success of the implementation of the Layer 1 of the WMSN relies in 
determining the interference levels produced by the proximity to the 
conductors and in establishing methods to avoid them. 
• A more advanced power system security application can be developed for 
analyzing voltage and islanding scenarios. 
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• The overload relief algorithm can be applied to more than two units in 
each direction. 
• Insert the recommendations automatically into the EMS. A real time 
generation control using a set of predetermined generation resources 
could be implemented just like the AGC function in a EMS. 
A number of new applications can take advantage of the implementation of the 
WMSN in the power system. Below are listed a number of them: 
• Dynamic rating of the line by using temperature sensors and strain 
sensors for measurement of sag. 
• Detection of pollution in the insulators by measuring the parasitic currents 
in the surface of the insulators. 
• Take advantage of the communication link between substations for 
relaying critical information when there is a loss of an RTU. 
• Robotic monitoring of overhead transmission lines, using the same 
mechanical principles than maintenance carts. 
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